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ABSTRA CT 
This Masters dissertation reviews the present methods of research in evacuation, various 
major fires are reported as part of this process. The findings of this research indicates 
that a delay in warning occupants in a building, to the threat of a fire, is a constant feature 
in fire disasters. Further the provision of early warning and an appropriate response are 
considered with reference to the reduction of the number of fatalities in fires. 
The thesis concerns the hypothesis that people with enhanced alarm information exhibit 
diminished panic. The resultant technological developments such as voice alarm 
messages and Informative Fire Warning systems [IFW] are reported. The effect of these 
systems by the minimisation of pre-movement or occupant response time in the decision 
making process are studied. Effects concerning the influence of, for example, mobility 
and alcohol upon human behaviour are also reported 
The main thrust of this thesis is to examine the methods by which the time of evacuation 
to safety in complex buildings can be observed and assessed. Two evacuation 
experiments on a shopping centre are studied and measurements were taken using digital 
technology to count occupants during the evacuations. The findings of the experimental 
work are summarised and reported and the adequacy of the fire evacuation system is 
assessed. The importance concerning management arrangements and alarm systems and 
future research are discussed. 
The two experiments were carried out using the Footfall digital counting mechanism 
proved very successful and the recording of all the data was carried out by the author 
with no additional assistance. The fire drills resulted in some interesting findings 
regarding occupant behaviour. The occupants appeared to place considerable trust in the 
information they received. The observed behaviour in the response to both fire 
evacuation drills in a similar environment may be explained in part by the task 
characteristics of the perceived emergency and the mode of cognitive processing created 
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by such circumstances. This suggests that untrained, unprepared occupants tend to resort 
to informal or intuitive processing, which can be influenced by instruction from either an 
alarm system or by persons in authority. 
The prospects for further work are the carrying-out of more evacuation experiments in 
order to develop reliability in the determination of pre-movement times. Further 
experiments would be in other types of premises of varying configurations and 
occupancies, using the same type of recording equipment that proved effective in the two 
experiments carried out. 
Page iii 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT 	 II 
CONTENTS 	 Iv 
FIGURES 	 VI 
CHAPTER ONE 	 1 
OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM 	 1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 	 1 
1.2 HISTORY 	 3 
1.3 RATIONALE 	 4 
1.4 OBJECTIVES 	 6 
CHAPTER TWO 	 8 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FIRE STUDIES 	 8 
2.1 PREAMBLE 8 
2.2 JUDICIAL ENQUIRIES 8 
2.3 TECIII'{ICAL STUDIES 10 
2.4 LABORATORY SIMULATIONS 11 
2.5 PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS 13 
2.6 COMPUTER SIMULATIONS 15 
2.7 CASE STUDIES 18 
2.8 SUMMARY 23 
CHAPTER THREE 	 24 
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR MEANS OF ESCAPE 	 24 
3.1 PREAMBLE 24 
3.2 DESIGN STRATEGY FOR SIMPLE BUILDINGS 24 
3.3 DESIGN STRATEGY FOR COMPLEX BUILDINGS 30 
3.4 PRE-MOVEMENT TIME 32 
3.5 BUILDING MANAGEMENT 32 
3.6 FIRE BEHAVIOUR IN BUILDINGS 33 
3.7 SUMMARY 35 
CHAPTER FOUR 	 36 
REQUIRED SAFE EXIT TIME 	 36 
4. 1 INTRODUCTION 	 36 
Page iv 
4.2 THE CONCEPT 
	 36 
4.3 SUMMARY 	 40 
CHAPTER FIVE 
	 42 
ASPECTS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 	 42 
5.1 PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 42 
5.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELS 42 
5.3 FIRE WARNING SYSTEMS 44 
5.4 SUMMARY 47 
CHAPTER SIX 
	 48 
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF AN EVACUATION SYSTEM 
	 48 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 48 
6.2 OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTAL WORK 48 
6.3 THE EXPERIMENT 49 
6.4 OBJECTIVES so 
6.5 THE BUILDING 50 
6.5 DATA RECOR1)ING 51 
6.6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 52 
6.7 EVACUATION 1 53 
6.8 EVACUATION 2 54 
6.9 COMMENT UPON OCCUPANT BEHAVIOUR 
	
. 56 
6.10 CONCLUSIONS. 62 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
	 65 
CONCLUSIONS 	 65 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 65 
7.1 FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW 65 
7.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 65 
7.3 HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 66 
7.4 EXPERIMENTAL OBSERVATIONS 66 
7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS 67 
7.6.1 STAFF TRAINING 67 
7.6.2 CORRECT ALARM SYSTEM 69 
7.7 PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER WORK 69 
7.4 SUMMARY 69 
REFERENCES 	 70 
Page V 
FIGURES 
FIGURE 1.1 
FATAL CASUALTIES FROM FIRE BY CATEGORY OF PREMISES 	 2 
FIGURE 3. 1 
FACTORS THAT AFFECT ESCAPE 
	 28 
FIGURE 3.2 
THE STACK EFFECT 	 31 
FIGURE 4.1. 
EVACUATION COMPONENTS 	 37 
FIGURE 5.1 
REQUIREMENTS FOR TYPES OF WARNING SYSTEMS 
	 45 
FIGURE 6.1 
SHOPPING CENTRE LEVEL ONE 	 51 
FIGURE 6.2 
SHOPPING CENTRE LEVEL TWO 	 52 
FIGURE 6.3 
MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION FOR EVACUATION 1 	 53 
FIGURE 6.4 
MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION FOR EVACUATION 2 	 54 
FIGURE 6.5 
GRAPH OF FLOW RATES OF OCCUPANTS FROM SHOPPING CENTRE 	 55 
FIGURE 6.6 
COMPARISON OF EVACUATION 1 AND 2 FROM SHOPPING CENTRE 	 56 
FIGURE 6.7 
PRE-MOVEMENT TIME EVACUATION 1 	 60 
FIGURE 6.8 
MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION EVACUATION 1 PREMOVEMENT TIME 60 
FIGURE 6.9 
PRE-MOVEMENT TIME EVACUATION 2 	 61 
FIGURE 6.10 
MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION EVACUATION 2 	 61 
PREMOVEMENT TIME 	 61 
FIGURE 6.11 
PRE-MOVEMENT TIME EVACUATION (SHEILDS) 	 62 
Page vi 
CHAPTER ONE 
OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the earliest times of man, the flight or fight response has been used to mitigate 
against the effects of a variety of disaster scenarios. A Chinese proverb recommends that 
"of the 36 ways to escape danger, running away is the best". Evacuation or running away 
has been used by man, to escape a diversity of dangerous occurrences. In our modem 
society and with the complications of different types of warning systems; it is important 
that designers understand the circumstances under which people will evacuate. This will 
enable designers of advanced buildings such as shopping complexes the ability to 
produce innovative and safe buildings. 
With regard to complex buildings, the efficiency, accuracy and clarity of evacuation 
messages by warning systems has had relatively little systematic study. In particular there 
has been a reluctance in building safety design to study aspects involving human factors 
and behaviour. Many studies [1] concerning exit design consider occupant movement 
similar to ball bearings being emptied into a box, i.e. movement regular and subject to the 
laws of mass transfer. When such models are applied to human beings in complex 
buildings the result is neither accurate, scientific nor realistic. 
Buildings vary according to their structure, form and function and when one of these fall 
outside the prescriptive codes that are predominately used, the resultant building could be 
described as unconventional or complex. Designers of unconventional or complex 
buildings require techniques' which depart from traditional fire safety concepts, and yet 
still achieve an acceptable and visible level of fire safety. Therefore, designers must 
decide upon the fire safety measures required to produce a realistic and reasonable level 
of risk. Before considering how the various principles and technical concepts are applied 
in the process of design, it is important to analyse the framework of the legislation that 
covers buildings designed for occupation. 
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Over recent years, a great deal of money has been spent on research by the fire engineers 
working for commercial companies, particularly in the areas of smoke control and fire 
detection. The evidence for this being the technological advancement in new systems on 
the market at the present time. The main motive has been to achieve a competitive edge 
over rival manufacturers of similar equipment. This has resulted in the commercial 
interests of manufacturers leading the designers and architects but this has not necessarily 
resulted in an improvement in life safety in buildings. The evidence for this can be seen 
in Figure 1.1 which indicate that the number of fatal casualties in occupied buildings 
(other than domestic property) has remained steady between 1984 and 1995. 
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FIGURE 1.1 FATAL CASUALTIES FROM FIRE BY CATEGORY OF PREMISES 
Statistics supplied by the Home Office [61 
Over the same period only a modest amount of research has taken place concerning safe 
means of escape [2}. The reason for this could be that that the fire engineering trade has 
no direct interest in these fundamental matters. It makes no difference to fire alarm 
manufacturers whether a person has to travel 10 metres or 100 metres to escape from a 
building or if it takes that person two and a half minutes or twelve minutes to reach a 
point of safety. Therefore there has been no recent alteration in evacuation times, escape 
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routes and travel distances; those used today originate from the Government paper titled 
"Post-War Building Studies". published in 1946 [1]. 
1.2 HISTORY 
The Government is responsible for formulating rules and regulations that attempt to limit 
fire hazards in buildings. The origin of these regulations can be traced back to codes that 
were introduced following the Great Fire of London in 1666 [3]. The Great fire of 
London burned for several days and although it destroyed a major pan of the city, there 
were relatively few fatalities. 
Following this serious fire, rules were put in place that attempted to prevent such a major 
disaster occurring again. These rules controlled the proximity of buildings to prevent 
external fire spread. This aspect of fire safety differs from other fire legislation in that it 
covers the safety of people in buildings other than that where the fire has occurred. This 
control was put in place to prevent a major conflagration that could involve many 
buildings and has a greater bearing on property protection than life safety. It could also 
be argued, however, that such controls can be justified on life safety grounds by the 
demands of society. The Great Fire resulted in the introduction of the Rebuilding Act for 
the City of London 1667. The Act provided a code with a means of enforcement, and 
served as a model for other provincial towns in subsequent years. 
The history of regulations concerning life safety through the provision of adequate means 
of escape is more recent and is the main aspect of fire safety around which all other 
aspects revolve. Standards which concern the provision of means of escape have 
developed by a similar process to those introduced following the Great Fire of London, 
and may be described as stable door legislation [4]. Following fire incidents where there 
has been significant loss of life, legislation has been introduced to either upgrade or 
initiate standards to appease the expectations of society. The fire at the Theatre Royal 
Exeter in 1887 was one of the forerunners in producing regulations that referred to the 
principles of means of escape. There were 186 deaths and subsequently the Public 
Health Act 1890 included provision for safe means of egress in places of public resort 
[3]. 
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Probably the most significant incident in the last century that has influenced means of 
escape principles was the Empire Palace Theatre fire Edinburgh in 1911. A magician on 
stage was carrying out a stunt with the use of fire, but unfortunately it went wrong. A 
safety curtain was lowered and the auditorium was safely evacuated of its 3000 spectators 
but the magician and some staff died. During the evacuation the orchestra played the 
national anthem which took 2.5 minutes; although not formally documented, many recent 
researchers [2] have suggested that this was how the average standard of 2.5 minutes to 
evacuate from a compartment fire was originated. This standard is still used today for 
small simple buildings. 
1.3 RATIONALE 
This reactionary process to formulate legislation has now been replaced by the use of 
statistics [5] that are compiled with ever more complexity. The interpretation of these, 
are now used to reduce the level of prescriptive guidance, and to concentrate resources on 
community fire safety. Statistics over recent years [5] has shown no increase in the 
number of fatal casualties in occupied buildings (other than domestic dwellings). In 1995 
the figure was 35 deaths. This is compared with the more serious problem of fire deaths 
in domestic property of 505 deaths in 1995 (figure 1.1). These statistics are now used by 
legislators to redefine the method of application from prescriptive control to risk 
assessment and self compliance. In the main these statistics are compiled by the Home 
Office Fire Research Department in Garston Hertfordshire [5] and have now begun to 
influence the direction of decision making by the Government. The Home Office are 
now pushing for resources to be channelled into reducing the number of fire deaths by 
education of the population in domestic property [6]. 
The use of these statistics over the past twenty years have led to questions being asked 
upon the validity of prescribed evacuation times [2]. Architects and builders have 
criticised the rigidity of the control systems, which have placed restrictions upon the 
design of complex buildings. It is thought that a more realistic approach is now required 
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[7] in the design of a variety of building types including open plan offices, atria, shopping 
malls and multipurpose entertainment complexes. 
The result of this criticism was the introduction of the new Building Regulations in 1985, 
where fire safety needs were expressed as a functional statement. The existing method 
defined by the Building Regulations Approved document B [8] was retained to cope with 
the design of small and conventional design, as described in Chapter 2. This document is 
one of a series that has been approved by the Secretary of State as a practical guide to 
meet the requirements of schedule one and regulation seven of the Building Regulations. 
The details in the guidance are intended to provide minimum, but appropriate solutions to 
the more common building situations and as such provide a one route design for simple 
buildings. There is no obligation for designers to adopt any particular solution in the 
Approved Document, as the functional statement also permits designers to pursue the 
requirement of any given situation and to design fire safety to meet identified hazards; 
this has been called the Fire Engineered solution. If this route is taken, then documentary 
evidence is required to demonstrate how that the functional statement has been satisfied. 
This change in approach has permitted designers to quantify the fire hazard and to 
prepare an integrated package of fire safety measures to achieve the declared fire safety 
objectives. Many of the buildings erected on Londons' Canary Wharf development in the 
1980's were the first using such design criteria. One example of this approach was the 
former Geological Museum in South Kensington, which has been transformed into a 
contemporary design now called the Earth Galleries [9]. The radical alterations were 
outside the parameters of Approved Document B, therefore a Fire Engineered solution 
was used to satisfy designers and enforcement agencies. This solution proved that the 
maximum population of 2,500 could be evacuated before a fire could produce hazardous 
conditions that could become untenable. The full process requires the quantification of 
the fire hazard, the design objectives and the required control measures. This technique 
has been developed using available knowledge, and consists of statistical data concerning 
fires, experimental data from studies and the theoretical analysis of particular fire risks. 
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This approach by Fire Safety Engineers can be described as the creation of structural and 
managerial arrangements, which in the event of an emergency ensure that a determined 
proportion of the occupants can safely evacuate. That is, to ensure that the time 
occupants would take to evacuate a building is less than the tenability levels within the 
building with a built in safety margin. The latest document to describe how to achieve 
such a goal is the British Standards Institute Draft for Development, Fire Safety 
Engineering in Buildings 240 [7]. Architects and Designers, as previously mentioned, 
have indicated there is a need to understand the relationship between occupant movement 
and the environment in which they move. This includes the time that is taken for the 
occupants to recognise and react to the necessity for evacuation, this is defined as the pre-
movement time. 
1.4 OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to develop and investigate the framework of critical 
factors that influence the design criteria for means of escape, with regard to the safety of 
occupants during evacuation. An important aspect of this study will be to incorporate an 
interdisciplinary approach to the investigation of those safety parameters which may 
influence design standards. 
The first aim of this research is to provide an overview of the previous studies that have 
been undertaken. In this part of the study the latest design principles will be discussed in 
addition to current research in occupant behaviour. This project will also consider the 
principles of current means of escape design for simple and complex buildings. These 
principles include the need to make numerous assumptions regarding occupant behaviour 
and movement when involved in fire emergencies. These assumptions will be 
investigated as part of the study since there is a dearth of empirical studies having been 
undertaken in this area. 
Psychological principles have been adopted by Canter [10], Sime [11] and Bryan [12], 
who have become the modem pioneers of research in evacuation behaviour and the 
effects of various types of alarm systems upon occupants. These studies have been 
carried out using either modelled computer scenarios or street surveys. It is proposed in 
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this project to study methods of recording evacuations, using the latest electronic 
technology for counting people in and out of complex buildings to gather this data and to 
compare it with published pre evacuation/occupant response times. 
The psychological reactions of occupants in a fire situation have been identified by Bryan 
[12] as a series of decision making processes starting with recognition. Sime [13] 
suggests that the first reaction of the occupants is to assume that the nature of the incident 
is minor in nature and that the threat to life is minimal even when this is not the case. He 
suggests that following the initial information evaluation a response will be made; to 
either do nothing, fight the fire or to evacuate the building. 
This study will evaluate the effectiveness of alarm systems with particular attention to the 
time from the beginning of a fire to the first movement of the occupants (pre-movement 
time). Advances have been made in understanding the movement of smoke and people in 
fires. Calculations now enable fire engineers to estimate the time from the start of a fire 
to the onset of hazardous conditions. These hazardous conditions are described as the 
time at which smoke entering the escape routes affects visibility, temperature, toxicity 
and the ability to breath. Active and passive fire safety measures within a building can 
have a significant influence on the time to hazard. The fire protection industry is now 
capable of providing smoke control systems that exhaust the products of combustion for a 
calculated period of time to enable occupants adequate escape time. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FIRE STUDIES 
2.1 PREAMBLE 
The few fires that result in the loss of human life in buildings other than domestic 
dwellings, make it difficult to study human behaviour in fires. Due to unpredictability, it 
is impossible to set up studies in advance of an incident. There have been attempts to 
gain information from people after an incident. One such study was carried out following 
the 1980 MOM hotel fire in America [14] in which a questionnaire was sent out to all 
those affected by the fire. However, the people that could have given the greatest 
information into human behaviour were unfortunately those that were killed in the 
incident. The current basis of knowledge on human behaviour in fires is extracted from a 
variety of data. Each in its own way has its own strengths and weaknesses, but all of 
them can be complemented by a scientific approach. 
When major incidents occur, a range of forms of enquiry may be set up, to try to establish 
a cause of the incident. These types of enquiry may take the following forms; judicial 
enquiries, teclmical reports, psychological surveys, psychological laboratory simulations, 
computer simulations and case studies; all aim to provide information that in the future 
may make the built environment a safer place to live. All of these enquiries to some 
extent overlap in the detail produced, but their effect upon understanding human reaction 
in fire is of variable quality. 
2.2 JUDICIAL ENQUIRIES 
A series ofjudicial reports have reviewed major incidents that have resulted in the loss of 
life in the twentieth century. These have either involved fire and the lack of provision of 
means of escape or the inadequacy in the provision of means of escape following disorder 
incidents. Football stadium incidents have been subject to a number of judicial enquiries, 
the nature of occupancy in sports grounds offer a number of similarities to those 
experienced in complex buildings such as shopping malls with occupants visiting on a 
casual basis. 
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One of the first of these was the Shortt Report of 1924 followed disorder at the Cup Final 
of 1923 [3]. The Moelwyn Hughes Report of 1946 followed the disaster at Bolton 
Wanderers ground when overcrowding caused 33 deaths. In 1966 the Government 
commissioned the Chester Report on "The State of Association Football". The 
Harrington Report of 1968 drew attention to problems of crowd behaviour and led to the 
Lang Report of 1969 on the same subject. In 1972, Lord Wheatley's Report on Crowd 
Safety at Sports Grounds followed the disaster at Ibrox Park, Glasgow, where 66 
spectators died. The McElhone Report of 1977 on Football Crowd Behaviour of Scottish 
supporters was commissioned by the Secretary of State for Scotland following disorder at 
the Wembley Stadium. As a result of the Wheatley Report, Parliament passed the Safety 
of Sports Grounds Act 1975. In January 1986, Mr Justice Popplewell, whose judicial 
enquiries, following the Bradford Disaster was the eighth in the series, summarised those 
of his seven predecessors. 
Finally the most recent inquiry was carried out when Lord Justice Taylor was instructed 
by the Home Secretary to inquire and to make recommendations about the needs of 
crowd control and safety at sports events. The first stage of the Inquiry was primarily 
concerned with the investigation of events at Hillsborough Stadium on 15 April 1989, 
when 95 people were crushed to death at a Cup semi-final match between Liverpool and 
Nottingham Forest. This report and the final recommendations are instrumental in 
promoting better and safer conditions at sports grounds in the future. 
Judicial enquiries conform to defined procedures as a pre-enquiry to the coroner's 
investigation. In analysis of these reports, although not their prime responsibility, they 
can guide legislation and education to mitigate against future tragedies. Whilst the value 
of these enquiries cannot be doubted, their advancement in the understanding of human 
behaviour is limited. This type of enquiry is rare and therefore only occasionally brings 
about change. A typical example was the inquiry following the Valley Parade Bradford 
City Football Club fire in 1985. Following this fire, where there were 56 deaths and 
many injuries. This event led to a working party, established under the aegis of Lord 
Justice Popplewell's [15] Inquiry into Crowd Safety and Control at Sports Grounds, 
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which made recomnendations and resulted in the Fire Safety and Safety of Places of 
Sport Act 1987, which amended the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975. Following the 
enquiry Lord Justice Popplewell stated: 
almost all the matters into which I have been asked to inquire and almost all the 
solutions I have proposed, have been previously considered in detail by many 
distinguished Inquiries over a period of 60 years. 
If we consider the high standard of Football Stadiums in the U.K. in the 1990's it can be 
seen that this legislation has been a major influence upon crowd control and stadium 
safety. The value of such enquiries cannot be doubted and their significance upon the 
legislation that has emerged from Parliament has been enormous, they have done little to 
help us understand human behaviour in fires. The fact that they only occur in history on 
a very few occasions means that though they may make a significant change to the 
legislation and standards at that particular moment in time they may not provide any 
useful guidance regarding new practices or technologies. Further the reactive nature of 
such enquiries are limited to that particular incident and do not have a broader base to 
look at minor incidents or near misses which may have occurred. 
2.3 TECHNICAL STUDIES 
Technical studies are another source of information about major incidents, where a major 
loss of life has occurred in a fire. These studies are carried out under laboratory 
conditions for example at the Building Research Station or a similar research 
establishment. They are mainly concerned with the source of ignition, the process of 
combustion, the progress of the fire and how the various components of the building 
inter-reacted. An example of such a study undertaken was following the Stardust Disco 
fire in Dublin [3] in 1981 in which 48 people died. A main feature of the study was the 
interaction between wall linings, heat radiation from low ceilings, and the use of foam 
backed carpet for wall coverings which contributed and aided rapid fire growth. These 
studies may give an insight into the physical conditions that the occupants were faced 
with, but rely upon assumptions and circumstantial evidence concerning human 
behaviour. Experiments which are carried out recreating the technical aspects of the fire 
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and its progress, rely on rigid details. Even so some of these details are based on 
assumptions, for example with regard to the means of escape design, all British Standard 
5588 building codes [16] rely on the following assumptions 
• 500mm is the maximum shoulder width of a person and therefore exit widths should 
be designed to cope with multiples of this width. 
• Two people exiting will exit side by side and therefore the exit with will be 1050 mm 
there will be no overlap. 
• To provide for additional exit capabilities simply add the provision of the extra person. 
• Psychological considerations are ignored with regard to exit width capacity, on the 
assumption that people will react the same as ball bearings. 
Pauls [9] criticised such design criteria and the assumptions, that are still in use today 
He stated that: 
"Not only do emergency responders appear to operate without a clear understanding of 
occupant evacuation, the building occupants face rude surprises when an emergency 
occurs. For example, occupants might not properly appreciate that, in a total 
evacuation, queuing and long evacuation times are inherent in our traditional and 
current approaches to means of escape". 
A typical example would be a large occupancy office block, department store or football 
stadium. In this type of building the large number of people leaving may mean that some 
people will block the evacuation of others. The effect of reduction in the escape route 
width and the potential of stair accidents can be disastrous, when large numbers of people 
are involved. 
2.4 LABORATORY SIMULATIONS 
The first attempt to make a systematic research investigation of the behaviour of people 
in fire was made at Loughborough University. Wood [17] carried out surveys attempting 
to study such human behaviour, both interview and questionnaires were used to evaluate 
human behaviour. Data was collated from over 1000 fire incidents from more than 2000 
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people. He concentrated his research on two main aspects of human reactions, movement 
through smoke and evacuation from the building. The main findings were that the 
reaction of occupants fell broadly into three categories; 
1) Concern with the evacuation of the building either by oneself or with others. 
2) Concern with firefighting or at least the containment of the fire. 
3) Concern with warning or alerting others, either individuals or the fire brigade 
Studies were also carried out at the Fire Research Station concerning the means of 
escape. Data concerning the movement of crowds was used to construct a mathematical 
model to predict the time necessary to evacuate high-rise buildings. Predictions from this 
model compared favourably with data from fire drills. Evacuation exercises were carried 
[19] out at Hackney hospital, with different staff and patient samples. Studies at Dundee 
University investigated occupant's attitude towards risk. Studies at Surrey University 
[22] have investigated informative fire warning systems and the reactions of building 
occupants to alarms from fire detection systems. 
These psychological surveys are another type of study, which provides a picture of 
human reactions in fires; the scientific psychological approach, using as few assumptions 
as possible. This information is collected from as many groups of people as possible 
affected by the fire. Therefore a framework from as many incidents is built up to predict 
what would happen in any future event. This said, there are many problems locating 
people who have evacuated or have been affected by a fire; once located they may not 
remember their actions in detail or may be psychologically affected by the experience 
and therefore find it difficult to discuss the event. 
A criticism that can be levelled at questionnaire techniques such as previously described 
is that they rely upon what people say they did and not on what they actually did at the 
time of the incident [18]. 
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2.5 PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS 
Psychological laboratory simulations endeavour to recreate aspects of human behaviour 
which may occur during a fire. Peschl [21] attempted to create controlled situations to 
examine human responses to various stimuli. The creation of situations where people 
may be in danger raises ethical arguments and if the people are not put in danger then 
only certain specific information can be gained. An example of this is the choice of exit 
routes or the visibility of exit signage through smoke. 
The Building Research Establishment (BRE) [22] has undertaken laboratory experiments 
between different fire warning systems, the purpose of the experiments was to evaluate 
the effectiveness of different systems to promote fast evacuation from buildings. One of 
the catalysts for the research was a report by Sime [23] who stated: 
In fires . . . . . . . the early stage of the recognition was ofien characterised by 
ambiguous information cues. In a number of cases there was a serious delay in people 
taking these cues seriously before they realised there was afire 
The experiments were carried out in the laboratory using a computer and a random 
selection of people. Two types of alarm system were tested they were (a) an ordinary fire 
bell, and (b) an Informative fire warning system (IFW). The aim of the IFW is to reduce 
this realisation by providing correct detail information, rather than a simple conventional 
fire warning bell. In the experiment, 13% of the population immediately evacuated when 
a simple fire bell was sounded this was similar to those findings by Tong and Canter [24]. 
Canter collected his data by street interview rather than a simulated laboratory 
experiment, but his results concluded that 14% of those interviewed thought that the most 
recent alarm that they had heard was a genuine fire emergency and out of this only 11% 
immediately evacuated. 
Because of the close comparison between the fire bell results of Canter and the BRE 
experiments, the BRE use this as a control and draws parallels between the real world 
conditions and the laboratory conditions. Canter did not carry out experiments on IFW 
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systems, but because of this close comparison with a fire bell, Canter has suggested that 
the BRE experiments would reflect the real response times to an IFW system. 
The results of the BRE experiment for IFW systems were that a six-fold increase in the 
correct interpretation of the alarm system compared with a conventional fire bell. The 
results also suggested that interpreting a fire warning as genuine does not guarantee an 
immediate evacuation by occupants. This indicates that the development of IFW systems 
and their introduction would reduce evacuation times and help overcome the problems 
encountered with the evacuation of complex buildings. In the early stages of a fire when 
a simple fire bell is sounded Tong and Canter [24] suggest; 
people have to cope with a prevailing state of uncertainty. This uncertainty results 
from the ambiguous nature of the information available so that fire victims consistently 
become involved in investigative and exploratory actions to determine the nature of the 
threat they are facing. The cues which most commonly motivated an initial inquiry by 
building occupants were strange noises, unaccustomed behaviour of others, such as 
running, and occasionally there was a direct encounter with smoke or flame". 
The suggestion that strange noises motivate people could be interpreted as a fire bell, but 
as can be seen from the experiments of Canter and the BRE an occupant is unlikely to 
recognise or interpret correctly the fire bell in the early stages of the warning. Those who 
do not ignore the alarm will choose to seek further conformation of an alarm and possibly 
seek a person in authority to confirm the appropriate response. 
In the BRE lboratory, [22] experiments involving different types of buildings were 
assessed. The result may seem obvious in that those familiar with the building 
interpreted a genuine fire warning, compared with those who were unfamiliar with the 
building layout. This adds weight to the argument that IFW systems should be installed 
in pubic building, where the occupants are unfamiliar with the sound of the building. 
During the composition of the BRE research, The Channel 4 Television Company 
approached the BRE to conduct an experiment for the Equinox television programme 
which was broadcast in 1991. The programme makers wished to test the hypothesis, that 
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IFW systems are more likely to promote a faster evacuation response than a simple fire 
bell warning system. They set out by arranging two groups of 10 subjects to visit 
Research House, London, informing them that they were to take part in market research. 
The two groups were introduced to a basement room which had a one-way minor on the 
wall, behind which filming could take place. 
The first group were introduced to the room and asked to complete a security 
questionnaire, after 5 minutes, a fire bell was set off in the corridor outside the room. 
After 3 minutes of the alarm sounding one female subject decided to investigate and left 
the room, the other occupants stayed and appeared to wait for her return. A further 6 
minutes later (9 minutes after the first alarm) one further occupant left the room, 11 
minutes after the start of the alarm all the occupants left the room. 
In the second group in the Channel 4 documentary, they were again put in the room and 
left. After 5 minutes the alarm bell was sounded for 5 seconds followed by the following 
announcement, 
"This is an intelligent fire warning system. There is afire above you on the ground floor, 
evacuate now 
Following the message the bell rang again for 5 seconds. As the message finished one 
occupant stood up and walked out followed by all the other subjects. 
This experiment provided a simple yet explicit demonstration of the advantages of an 
IFW. In the first test a bell alone did not provide sufficient warning to motivate an 
immediate evacuation for this type of occupant. However, in the second test the speed 
that the occupants evacuated was swift, in fact within one minute of the alarm being 
raised, the occupants had left the building. It can be presumed that the reaction in the 
second test was due to the explicit nature of the information that they received. 
2.6 COMPUTER SIMULATIONS 
Due to their increasing popularity, computer modelling techniques are establishing a 
successful track record having been used to analyse some of the major fires in recent 
times such as the MGM Grand fire [14]. This type of modelling in post-fire investigation 
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has the benefit that only one fire scenario is modelled, as opposed to the design 
environment where there maybe many possibilities 
Computer simulations are now being developed, using the best available knowledge from 
a range of sources. Canter [20] first experimented with simple computer programmes to 
simulate a fire event. Computer software has been developed, which models evacuation 
of large populations through multi-storey buildings. Two such systems are Simulex [25] 
and Exodus [26], which aim to provide a realistic prediction of building evacuation 
scenanos. 
The Exodus model was developed to provide simulated human responses to aircraft 
emergency situations, but the aircraft components can be switched off, to provide a 
modified version for the simulation for simple public building evacuations. The Exodus 
software comprises of five core interacting components, the occupant, movement, 
behaviour, hazard, and toxicity submodels. Values are set for each individual, thus 
creating different attributes to each individual with unique performance capabilities. 
The spatial dimensions within the exodus model are extended over a two-dimensional 
grid with a simulation clock. The grid maps out the geometry of the enclosure, locating 
exits, internal walls and obstacles. Multi-storey models can be made up by using 
multiple grids, which can be connected by stair nodes, this type of building geometry can 
be stored in a geometry library for later use. 
The latest version of Exodus is suitable for application in the design of supermarkets, 
hospitals, industrial premises, rail stations, airport terminals, sports stadia, cinemas, 
shopping malls and high-rise buildings. These are the type of buildings typical of those 
considered in this study. 
This model can run with three different types of population; population A comprises of 
people with an instantaneous response time and with identical travel speeds. Population B 
comprises of people with an instantaneous response time but with a range of travel speeds 
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and population C consists of people with a range of response times and a range of travel 
speeds. These response times are set between 0 and 120 seconds, this is an 
approximation that seems to underestimate the response time in reality. Such models can 
only be as accurate as the inputted information with regard to response times and travel 
speeds. 
The Simulex model is also a software tool, which models the evacuation of large 
populations through complex multi-storey buildings. This system can be used with 
computer aided design [CAD] based information of the building layout. The system 
models a number of psychological factors, including choice of exit and response time to 
alarm. Simulex allows the user to specify a response time for the occupants, this as yet is 
a pre-set time for all the occupants. It is intended that a future version of Simulex will 
incorporate a function, which will assess certain factors and estimate the time taken for 
an occupant to assess her/his response times. 
Both systems could become useful design tools for the fire safety engineers, provided that 
accurate information is fed into the programme. The correct estimating of the pre-
movement times or response times is important in order to attain a correct solution. Thus 
more data and research is required to establish a realistic and accurate response time, 
which should vary depending on the type of alarm system installed in a particular 
building. The type of alarm system would then be seen to have a definite effect on the 
evacuation time and could be taken into account with regard to relaxing prescriptive 
travel distances. Draft for Development 240 (third draft October 1996) Fire Safety 
Engineering in Buildings issued by British Standard Institution [27] and the 1991 
Australian Building Fire Safety System Code [28] proposed a risk assessment system, 
which takes into account various subsystems. One of these is the response time of the 
occupants, even though these guides have been superseded, this subsystem is still in the 
research stage and the use of the pre-movement part of the codes and cannot be 
considered accurate at this point in time. 
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2. 7 CASE STUDIES 
Case studies of individual fires or incidents can achieve a great deal in understanding 
events in particular cases. If this information is used in conjunction with other events in 
similar types of buildings, an act of frequency can be achieved, which can be displayed in 
terms of percentages. The analysis of behaviour at major incidents can help clarify and 
refine a model of human behaviour in emergencies. These behaviour patterns have been 
described by Canter [10], following his case study into the fire at King's Cross Station as 
recognition, action and evacuation. 
At the Woolworths' fire, Manchester in 1979 [29] with 500 people on the premises, a 
rapidly growing fire broke out in the furniture department at about 13.20 hours on the 
second floor of the four-storey store; which did not benefit from a water sprinkler system. 
There was delay in sounding the alann and subsequent delay in calling the fire brigade. 
Ten people died in the fire, a study of the event suggested that many of the victims were 
in the restaurant at the time of the fire. Locked exit doors hindered escape and smoke 
logging of the one staircase open prevented its use. In this fire people had to be rescued 
from windows and the roof of the building. The spectre of another store tragedy reared 
its head again after a fire swept through a department store in Chesterfield, Derbyshire on 
7 May 1993 [30], killing an elderly couple and forcing hundreds of other shoppers to flee 
the smoke and flames. Four fire-fighters and three children were among the 34 taken to 
hospital. The blaze broke out on the first floor of the three-storey Littlewoods store 
shortly before 10.00 hours. The floor housed rows of clothing racks and kitchenware 
displays, with a third of the floor space taken up by a restaurant area. On the day of the 
fire the store was holding a cheap breakfast offer and the restaurant was crowded with 
elderly people and mothers with children in pushchairs. The two people who died were 
in the restaurant when the fire broke out. The fire is thought to have started among some 
clothes racks towards the centre of the floor, close to one of the walls. According to a 
spokesman for Derbyshire Fire and Rescue Service, 
"the fire spread extremely rapidly through the first floor area causing severe damage, 
but it was contained to that floor. 
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The store did not have a sprinkler system, nor did it have a smoke detection system, but it 
did have automatic fire doors, which protected the elevator shafts. The severity of the 
fire may have been increased by a chimney effect caused by the flow of air from open 
doors and windows through the aisleways between the rows of clothes racks. 
Experts from the Fire Research Station [30] recreated the conditions of the fire, using 
their department store test rig at the Cardington laboratory. These case studies have given 
the researcher themes to investigate in incidents. The main theme from the above 
tragedies being, that of deaths from fire, in department stores, that contain restaurants. 
The Home Office have recognised this theme and have commissioned research into the 
problem of fire in Department stores with restaurants. 
In a comparable type of building and occupancy, recent major fires have occurred at 
airports. The most recent of these involved the fire at Dusseldorf Intemational Airport 
[31] on the 11th April 1996 when 17 people lost their lives. This follows airport fires at 
John F. Keimedy in 1989 and one at Kuala Lumpur in 1993, both of which had fatalities. 
In December 1997 a large fire occurred at Heathrow Airport in Terminal 1 [31], the fire 
originated in a roof space above a fast food outlet and spread right along a row of shops. 
There were no casualties and all the occupants evacuated with no help from the 
Emergency Services. 
The incident at Dusseldorf happened at the second largest airport in Germany serving 
15.2 million people each year. On the day of the incident at Dusseldorf, welding was 
being carried out on the roof structure above a flower shop. This caused a fire in the roof 
space and a flashover occurred sending flames and smoke throughout that section of the 
airport terminal. The lack of smoke detection in the ceiling void initially delayed the 
activation of the fire alarm system, when the smoke eventually percolated the false 
ceiling, it set off the fire alarm system and the evacuation should have begun. 
At the start of the fire several people were in the multilevel car park and even though they 
could see smoke coming from the terminal they used the lift to escape. This lift 
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descended into the terminal and when the doors opened, all the occupants died inside 
from the inhalation of smoke. The fire spread rapidly up through the building and several 
people were killed in a second floor departure lounge. The rapid progress of the fire 
throughout the building could be contributed to the lack of sprinklers, as this part of the 
airport building dated back to 1972. The total cost of the damage to the building was 
estimated at £50 million, seventeen people lost their life and sixty-seven people were 
injured. 
One of the main reasons for the loss of life was the poor conmrnnication caused by the 
loudspeaker announcements informing the 2,500 people to evacuate by the ground floor 
exits; this was the area at the seat of the fire. Fire-fighters reported that many of the 
occupants ignored instructions to use the fire exits and panicked. As the instructions 
given by the announcements were given in German but many of the foreign occupants 
could not understand the instructions. Approximately 250 people were trapped on the 
upper levels of the terminal and had to be released by fire-fighters using ladders. 
It can be seen from studying the Dusseldorf fire, that initially the people on the car park 
level were in no immediate danger. They could see the smoke coming from the terminal 
and yet decided to proceed into the terminal via the lift and subsequently to their deaths. 
They must have gone through the process of recognition that it was a fire then the 
validation that their assumption was correct. They then would have defined the 
seriousness of the incident by the amount of smoke and then evaluate the information to 
make their fatal decision to proceed into the lift and into the terminal. 
This incident highlights problems which occur when attempting to evacuate a complex 
building. People will further investigate the incident and ignore warning signals to 
answer questions such as; a) is it a real fire, b) a fire alarm test, c) a false alarm or d) 
some other type of warning signal. Even when occupants see smoke, it is not always 
seen as a trigger to suggest that escape is necessary. Incidents at the Bradford City 
Football Club [15] and the Woolworth's fire in Manchester [10] have generated accounts 
of people, who had seen the fire and smoke, but choose not to escape until it was too late. 
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Human behaviour in a fire situation have been identified by Bryan [12] as a series of 
decision making processes which start with recognition. This may be either hearing the 
fire alarm; abnormal reactions of other occupants; seeing smoke or flame; or by gaining 
information from other people. This is based upon the assumption that people know what 
the fire alarm is and what it sound it makes. Following this recognition the occupants 
attempt to validate the information given either by investigation or by questioning other 
people. If the evidence has been validated as accurate then the occupant will proceed to 
gain further information as to the qualitative nature of the threat, for example the 
intensity of the smoke and the size of the fire. Proulx [23] suggests that the first reaction 
of the occupants is to assume that the nature of the incident is minor in nature and that the 
threat to life is minimal, even if this is not the case. Following this evaluation of 
information a response will be made for example; to do nothing, to fight the fire or to 
evacuate. 
Any person watching the football match on television in 1985 live from the Bradford City 
Football ground would see that the majority of the spectators could see the fire, but 
assumed that it would not affect them. Therefore many did nothing in the early stages, 
even though the suggestion for evacuation appear obvious to anyone watching a video 
recording of the event. This defensive behaviour must have been the cause of death of 
many people in similar situations. Deaths in fires in complex buildings are thought to be 
more likely to be due to either delays in actuating alarm systems or the delay in the 
response of the occupants to the alarm system [13]. 
Mother assumption has been that the occupants will move immediately the alarm has 
been sounded. This cannot be relied on however the time delay will vary will depend on 
the occupancy. If the occupancy is primarily staff who have been well trained, then the 
response time will be less than in the case of untrained staff. If the occupants are the 
general public, then the length of response time will depend on the type of alarm system 
and the staff management of the evacuation. An example of this occuffed at the Arndale 
Centre in Manchester in July 1996 following a coded message to the Authorities from the 
IRA. The Centre was evacuated in approximately 12 minutes prior to the IRA bombing, 
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at the time the shopping centre and office block contained between 30,000 and 40,000 
people. Mr Walker [33] the centre manager stated that: 
"the fast evacuation was carried out only because of the quality of the training and drills 
that the management carried out on a regular basis 
As part of this study some of the shop workers were interviewed, who were on duty on 
the day. It was found that even though a fast evacuation was carried out, they still had 
difficulty motivating members of the public. The trained staff had to be insistent with the 
public who initially did not want to leave and could not perceive the risk. There was also 
a problem with the 'Saturday only' staff who did not understand the evacuation 
procedures, as they had not received regular training. As a result of this the centre 
management have now have now improved the training given to Saturday staff. 
Once the alarm has been raised, the decision making process regarding evacuation is 
dependent upon the information a person has prior to the outbreak of fire. This is in the 
form of knowledge of the building with regard to exit routes, the ability to identif' that 
the alarm is indeed a fire alarm and the knowledge of what to do when the fire alarm is 
activated. Inmost British workplace buildings this knowledge is a requirement of Health 
and Safety Legislation under the 1974 Act. In buildings used by members of the public 
they do not necessarily have the information required to make the correct decisions, when 
required to evacuate the building. To enable the general public to make correct 
decisions; escape routes should be recognised; for example a route, which is used to gain 
access to the building will be of much more value than one which is only used for 
emergency purposes. The notion that when visiting a shopping centre, escape routes 
down dark service corridors will be readily used by members of the public, who are under 
stress, does not appear a logical assumption [2]. This gives rise to the idea that exit routes 
should have a weight value put on them, where routes in normal use would have a higher 
rating than those not usually used by the occupants. This would make the initial design of 
buildings more realistic with regard to the possible location and use of the exit routes. 
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2.8 SUMMARY 
Research methodologies and fire studies of various kinds have shown that the nature of 
an individuals behaviour during the different stages of an emergency evacuation will be 
dependant upon many factors, such as prior knowledge, experience and training. Over 
the years various types of enquiries have investigated these factors, but as we enter the 
twenty-first century a more structured and scientific approach using some of the 
information already gained has been initiated. This approach is discussed in the 
following chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR MEANS OF ESCAPE 
3. 1 PREAMBLE 
The need for a basic safety criteria Fire Safety Engineering can be clearly understood by 
understanding the primary goal; that is to ensure that in the event of a fire emergency, 
building occupants have sufficient time to evacuate from the building, without being 
seriously affected by the products of combustion. With this concept in mind the method 
to achieve this goal can be dependant upon the type of building and the nature of the 
occupants. Age, mobility, influence of alcohol, sleeping risk and the occupant's 
knowledge of the building are just a few of the determinants that may influence 
evacuation speed. Studies by researchers such as Bryan [12] and Proulx [32] have 
considered the psychological behaviour of people but this has not as yet been fully taken 
into account in the design of complex buildings. 
3.2 DESIGN STRATEGY FOR SIMPLE BUILDINGS 
Conventional methods of escape design are based on principles that are simplistic, so that 
at all times the occupants of a building can turn their backs on any fire and move away 
from the fire to a place of safety. This place of safety should be outside the building. To 
achieve this, occupants should be able to use either, their own efforts or the assistance of 
other occupants of the building at the time an emergency occurs. In order to achieve an 
acceptable standard the following basic principles must be applied. These standards are 
the basis for current guidance in the British Standards 5588 series [16] which relates to 
all types of building in use today. These standards maybe summarised as; 
• there is an adequate detection of fire and a means of giving an alarm; in a small open 
plan premises this may be achieved by detection with the human nose and voice; 
• there should be sufficient escape routes from all parts of the building, enabling the 
occupants to move away from danger to a place of ultimate safety that is outside the 
building; 
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• the escape routes should be sufficient in number and width to avoid congestion; 
• the distance that a person may have to travel to a protected route must be limited; 
• escape routes must be clearly identifiable by strangers to the building. 
In 1946 the Fire Post War Studies Report [1] included some of the first research 
concerning occupant movement through exits and stairways. Physical tests were carried 
out on building evacuations and calculations were made following observations. More 
extensive tests had already been carried out were carried out in America, especially by 
the United States Bureau of Standards, the results of which were published in the Design 
and Construction of Building Standards in 1935 [1]. These tests were carried out under 
random flow conditions, i.e. in the course of normal use of the buildings and during fire 
drills. This exit research, was continued by researchers such as Peschl [21], who also 
analysed queuing behaviour. This type of research has helped identif' the potential 
congestion in stairwells and at exits. The research has resulted in evacuation modelling 
to serve as tool for identiing and analysing the factors that influence evacuation time of 
occupants in fire emergencies such as computer models. The simplest of these is the 
mathematical model, which emphasises the physical parameters associated with occupant 
movement and the buildings dimensions. The core of this form of modelling is, flow, 
unit width and time which provide a basis for the mathematical solution as presently used 
in Building Regulations [8]. Flow times and total evacuation times, derived from these 
parameters are of primary interest. Flow can be described as the number of occupants, 
who pass some reference point in a unit of time. 
The determination of a suitable clearance time to be used as a basis for calculation 
appears to have been taken from a single incident under actual fire conditions. The 
Empire Palace Theatre incident, of 1911 [3] which appears to be the origins of the 
evacuation time used not only in Great Britain, but in many countries around the world. 
The evacuation time of 2.5 minutes has been a standard that has now come into question 
with many escape planners. This was a consequence of the development of new types of 
building products and building systems that evolved in the 1970's and 1980's [2]. The 
provision of fire containment and protection of the means of escape is the prime objective 
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of this basic design criteria. The escape time limit of 2.5 minutes is based upon a unit 
exit width of 500mm allowing a flow rate of 40 persons per minute. This simple formula 
is used by the relevant codes [16], [4] in use today in the U. K. which are used to estimate 
the number of exit widths required from any room or building. 
u
- 
N 
40 x 	 T 	 ...............................................Equation (1) 
Where: 
N = the total number of occupants 
I = the time to escape in minutes 
U = the number of exit widths of 500mm 
To calculate the number of exit routes required the following equation is used 
U 
....................................................Equation (2) 
Where: 
E = the number of exits required 
The purpose group of the occupants in most fire safety evacuation codes and guidance 
documents give consideration to human characteristics. These are sleeping risks, 
familiarity with the building and mobility. Those groups that require more time to 
evacuate are given less distance to travel. Typically the recommended maximum travel 
distance to a protected route for shops and offices is 12-18m, where there is only one exit 
route and 30m if there are two or more exits. The effect of internal walls and fittings 
infers that the actual travel distance to a staircase should not exceed 1.5 times the 
maximum direct distance. 
The staircase widths are designed to enable all the occupants of a floor to enter the 
staircase within the evacuation time and for multi-staircase buildings it is assumed that 
one of the staircases is affected by the fire and must therefore be unusable. The 
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maximum flow rate on staircases [34] is assumed to be 80 persons per metre width per 
minute. If this flow rate is assumed and the evacuation time of 2.5 minutes is allowed, 
then the maximum number of people, who can enter the staircase is expressed by 
Melinek [35] as; 
M = 200 b + (18b + 14b 2) (n-i) ...................................Equation (3) 
Where; 
M 	 is the number of people who can be enter the staircase in the acceptable time; 
b 	 is the aggregate width of the stairs (in metres); 
n 	 is the number of stories in the building; 
This equation is very similar to the equation used in Building Regulations [35] for 
buildings not exceeding 30 metres in height which is given as; 
M =200 b + 50(b - 0. 3) (n-i) .....................................Equation (4) 
Using equation 3 the calculation for a three storey building with a one metre staircase is 
equal to a maximum 264 people and using equation 4 the calculation is 266 people. 
Equation 4 is the basis for tables contained within all codes for buildings in the U.K. 
these are the Building Regulations Approved Document B [8] and the British Standards 
Institute 5588 part ito ii [16] 
The Building Regulations allow designers to provide a variety of solutions provided that 
the controlling authorities can be satisfied of the adequacy of their design. This design 
model suggests that there should be no surges or queues, but rather a constant use of an 
exit to full capacity, until the last occupant safely clears the exit. Also assumptions are 
made that can and have proved fatal in recent times, for example in incidents such as the 
Bradford Football stadium fire (1985), the Woolworth's fire Manchester (1979) and the 
Stardust Disco fire Dublin (1981). 
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The shortcomings of these models can be seen to be [22]: 
the assumption that the building occupants are alert and able-bodied; 
the assumption that occupants will start to move at the same time when the alarm has 
been activated; 
the assumption that contra-flow of occupants will not occur in their attempts to 
escape. i.e. ; unidirectional flow only; 
• many behavioural movements, such as perception of cues, investigation of the incident 
which does not involve movement towards exits or along exit routes is not considered. 
A particular weakness in the simple escape model is the fact that it does not calculate 
times explicitly in relation to the architectural complexity of the setting, the type of alarm 
warning system and the nature of the occupants. The user categories of a building are 
described in Building Regulations and can have a major influence on the escape time for 
the occupants can be seen in figure 3.1, these are: 
• familiar with the building and awake. 
• familiar with the building but possibly asleep. 
• unfamiliar with the building but awake. 
• unfamiliar with the building but possibly asleep. 
FAMILIAR WITH 
	 NONE OR 
AWAKE 	 BUILDING 	 RELATIVELY 
FEW NEED 
A ASSISTANCE 
PUSSII3LY UNFAMILAR 	
. z 	 SIGNIFCANT 
SLEEPING 	 WITH THE 	 NUMBERS MAY 
BUILDING 	 NEED 
ASSISTANCE 
FIGURE 3.1 FACTORS THA T AFFECT ESCAPE 13.11 
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In each of the above categories there could be a number of occupants who also require 
assistance to exit the building due to physical or mental disabilities. 
The U. K. building codes do not take into account the type of warning system or the 
number of staff that could assist in the evacuation process, all refer to British Standard 
5839 : Part I: 1988 Fire detection and alarm systems for buildings, system design. The 
code provides recommendations for the planning, design, installation and servicing of fire 
detection and alarm systems used in and around buildings. It does not recommend 
whether a fire alarm system should be installed in any given premise. Within the code it 
is recommended that the design of the fire alarm system will depend on the actions 
required after the alarm has been given. It suggests that in premises in which normally 
active persons resort that they will react in a rational manner. This does not accord with 
the finding of most of the researchers in this field. 
To cover the legislative requirements of small volume, simple buildings the Government 
has introduced The Fire Precautions (workplace) Regulations 1997 which have been put 
in place under the fire Precautions Act 1971 and became effective in December 1997. 
The Regulations give effect to the European Community Council Directive 89/391 [3] 
requiring the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the health and 
safety of workers at work. The regulations apply to Great Britain and effectively bring in 
the risk assessment duties that apply under the Management of Health and Safety at Work 
Regulations 1992 in relation to the assessment of risks from fire at the workplace and the 
need to take the necessary precautions. It places the responsibilities on the employer for 
small premises for protecting staff from identifiable risks in the workplace and for the 
removal or reduction of such risks to protect employees. This method of self compliance 
through a written risk assessment to reduce the hazards in the workplace it is suggested 
by the associated guidance documents should not be burdensome or costly. The notion 
that employers of small premises can carry out their own risk assessment and decide on 
the required level of safety may prove costly in terms of loss of life in the long run. 
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3.3 DESIGN STRATEGY FOR COMPLEX BUILDINGS 
The full evacuation strategy of large complex buildings cannot cope with this guidance. 
If this philosophy is applied for example to the Kuala Lumpur City Centre project [36], 
which is the tallest building in the world (Petronas Twin Towers), it would be impossible 
to evacuate the building in 2.5minutes. In fact the total evacuation time is 93 minutes, 
with 30 minutes for the occupants to gain access to the protected staircases [36]. If one 
staircase is considered as unusable, as suggested in the Malaysian Uniform Building By-
law 1984, the evacuation time would increase to 90 minutes for all the occupants to enter 
a protected staircase and the total evacuation time would be 140 minutes. A complex 
zoned evacuation technique has been used to address the problem using the latest 
telemetry technology. Zoned evacuation relies upon only part of the occupants of the 
building, to initially evacuate. The occupants in the part of the building closest to the fire 
are evacuated first iimnediately, whilst the occupants of the other parts of the building 
remain until their evacuation is necessary. In practice, this usually means the occupants 
of the storey on which the fire starts, and those on the floor above are evacuated first, 
along with any person within the building that may require assistance to evacuate, for 
example those with reduced mobility or those with impaired vision. The order of 
subsequent phases of evacuation will usually be dependant upon the development of the 
fire, however the next phase would be those above the fire rather than those below the 
fire floor. 
An example of this type of evacuation occurred in the World Trade Centre in New York 
in 1993 [37] when a bomb was exploded in the basement. This resulted in the evacuation 
of approximately 10,000 people, which took two and a half hours, in this incident six 
people died and one thousand people were injured. The occupants who were 
subsequently interviewed realised it was an emergency, not only because of the vibration 
felt throughout the building but also because of the smoke that infiltrated the building a 
few minutes after the shock-wave. It was reported that people within the building carried 
out their duties as they had been instructed. However, as Donald [38] suggested, people 
in an emergency situation seldom recognise the urgency and generally do not respond 
immediately to the hazard. According to evacuees of the Trade Centre incident, in the 
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early stages the crowd was so tightly packed that it restricted movement, also it was 
reported that reverse flow of evacuees took place to escape the smbke in the staircases. 
The smoke logging of the staircase and the length of time the smoke took to clear the 
staircase has been attributed to the extraordinarily height of the buildings, and to the 
potential for the stack effect. 
Roof vent 
Smoke curtain 
Air inlet 
Smoke channelled 
by balcony upstonds 
FIGURE 3.2 THE STACK EFFECT 
The stack effect as illustrated in figure 3.2 is one of the most important influences on 
smoke movement in a high-rise building [39]. The vertical movement of air through a 
building caused by a difference in density between the air inside and that outside the 
building. In simplistic terms, if a tall shaft in a high-rise building is vented at the roof 
and street levels, and the air inside is hotter than the air outside, air will flow in at the 
bottom and out at the top, creating an upward flow. Conversely, if the air inside is cooler 
than the air outside, the flow will be in the opposite direction. 
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3.4 PRE-MOVEMENT TIME 
A delay in the time for occupants to initially start to evacuate is a ffindamental problem 
that has characterised large scale fire disasters involving injury such as the Bradford City 
Football Club ground and King's Cross Underground Station. With the background of 
such incidents and design problems on the development of the Canary Wharf project 
London in the early 1980's, a demand to resolve this problem was made by the 
Department of Trade and Industry [DTI]. The aim was to create a more scientific and 
flexible solution for designing complex buildings. Fire Engineering techniques in the U. 
K. have now progressed to a high enough level of understanding, for a code or guidance 
document for complex projects issued in 1997 the British Standards Institute issued a 
Draft for Development document [7]. In this document all buildings are incorporated 
into one code, whereas previously complex buildings had a variety of codes issued by 
various agencies. 
3.5 BUILDING MANAGEMENT 
The nature and type of complex buildings has changed over the past twenty years and to 
reflect this from the beginning of the 1990's. The British Standards Institution has 
adopted guidance, which not only deals with the design of buildings, but this incorporates 
the concept of safety management [16]. This is reflected in the new standards now issued 
with use of the building included in the title of the documents. The first document to 
reflect this shift was British Standard 5588 part 6 Code of practice for Assembly 
Buildings issued in 1991 [40]. This highlights the view that major loss of life in complex 
building fires is not only caused by poor design of buildings but also by inferior building 
management, as highlighted by the enquiry following the Woolworth's fire of 1979 [3]. 
To understand the problems caused by inferior design/management and the interaction 
with the alarm system, which has resulted in major loss of life it is worthwhile to 
investigate examples of such incidents. The type of alarm system and how the occupants 
reacted, may give Fire Engineers an improved cognisance of human reaction to alarm 
systems. However, some disasters if researched, would have little or no value with 
regard to human reaction to alarm systems, but would prove the inadequacies of the 
management systems and procedures. 
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A notable example of poor management influencing the loss of life was the Summerland 
fire in August 1973 [41]. In this case, even though there was a fire alarm, it was not 
activated. The person left in the control room had not been trained in emergency 
decisions and had no knowledge of the various systems built into the leisure complex. In 
fact the first call to the Fire Brigade was originated from a ship eleven miles out at sea 
and the subsequent enquiry criticised the lack of staff training. Staff need effective 
training in what to do in a fire to reduce delays in evacuation. Their role is crucial and 
they should know the building and what actions they might or might not be expected to 
carry out. 
3.6 FIRE BEHAVIOUR IN BUILDINGS 
The methods derived from heat transfer engineering have long been available for 
assessing structural behaviour in fires. Fire Engineering has now developed well beyond 
solely structural considerations [42]. The theory of fluid dynamics is now used to model 
the movement of gases and smoke and it is now recognised that the physical and 
chemical processes interact in a complex way [25]. The physical theory itself is a branch 
of fluid dynamics which places heavy demands on the computing resources that may be 
used to solve practical problems. The experimental validation of fire models usually 
depends on a handfhl of tests because large-scale fires are expensive to stage. Experience 
of accidental fires is also limited because they are relatively rare events. Most fires 
develop through their early stages without observers, and therefore analysis depend on 
carefifi examination of the debris. 
To bring together the recent research in fire dynamics a guidance document has been 
issued by the British Standard Institute. The Fire Safety Engineering in Buildings, Part 1. 
1997, Guide to the Application of Fire Safety Engineering Principles [7], has been issued 
as a working draft for development, but not as a complete British Standard. In this 
document an attempt has been made to distinguish between the levels of requirement 
necessary for life safety purposes and for the prevention of conflagration. One of the 
most important features of the document is the fire safety requirement of a total system in 
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which both active and passive measures are required and in which flexibility is permitted 
[7]. By adopting a fire safety engineering approach taking into account the total fire 
safety package it is hoped to provide a more fundamental and economical solution than 
some of the more prescriptive approaches to fire safety. The document [7] attempts to 
adopt a systemic approach to develop a framework consisting of fire safety sub-systems 
interacting with each other. The Code intends to provide a standard method for building 
designers to depart from traditional fire safety concepts, with the provision that they can 
demonstrate that the building will still achieve an acceptable level of fire safety. 
The Code of Practice defines the following basic stages: 
a) Define the problem. 
b) Analyse the problem using fire safety engineering principles. 
c) Repeat stages a and b until an acceptable solution is found. 
d) Report the findings. 
The Code of Practice names the stages involving fixing the limits of the problem as the 
'Qualitative Design Review' [QDR]. When the QDR comes to an end the following 
questions must have been answered: 
• What level of fire safety is acceptable? 
• What are the precise features and dimensions of the building? 
• What factors limit possible solutions? 
• What are the main hazards and consequences? 
• What fire safety measures are going to be in place? 
• What scenarios are going to be studied? 
• What method of analysis is going to be used? 
When all these questions have been answered the analysis of the building can begin. For 
the analysis phase, the Code of Practice provides two alternative ways of analysing the 
building. The first method relies upon probabilities to determine the likelihood of death 
Page 34 
or injury. The second method uses complex calculations that describe the properties of 
fire, to determine whether occupants can escape safely. 
In the Draft Design 240 guide sub-system 6 [7] draws on the characterisation of the 
occupants taking into account their number, their distribution, and their physical abilities. 
These factors are given weight so that the escape design encompasses this information. 
The designer must also take into account the building type and design and in particular 
the types of alarm system that is to be provided. Irrespective of any other devices that 
may be installed in a complex building; to detect and give warning of a fire outbreak 
(such as automatic fire detection or extinguishing systems) is fundamental. Also all 
premises are required by law to have some means whereby the alarm of fire may be given 
by a person discovering an outbreak of fire. 
3.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed how a more scientific approach by fire engineers is now 
beginning to be used. The nature of the occupancy and the role of the individual in a 
particular setting could prove critical to successful evacuation. With a more scientific 
approach to evacuation problems it is hoped that future deaths and injuries in complex 
buildings may be significantly reduced. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REQUIRED SAFE EXIT TIME 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of studying the evacuation of occupants from buildings is to provide a 
practical technique for estimating the safe available egress time subsequent to the 
detection of a fire. The available safe egress time can be defined as the interval between 
the time of successful fire detection and alarm and the time when the products of 
combustion create a hazardous condition. 
The movement of crowds in buildings have been the subject of comprehensive research 
mainly by Pauls [43] and Kendik [44] and to a limited extent in the past by Melinek [45]. 
This research suggested that various types of information will be required, for instance, 
staircase width, number of stories served by the staircase, and rate of flow of people to 
produce a satisfactory result. This research has now been coupled with the rapidly 
evolving computer technology, which has facilitated the analysis of emergency 
evacuation in comparing different building designs and escape routes. This has resulted 
in the development of models, which analyse different escape routes, and can produce an 
average value and standard deviation for the evacuation time for a building with known 
design features. 
4.2 THE CONCEPT 
The objective of studying available safe escape time (ASET) [13] is to develop a practical 
technique for estimating the available safe egress time subsequent to the detection of a 
fire. ASET can be described as the interval between the time of successful fire detection 
and alarm, and the time when hazardous conditions prevail in the building space. 
Designers should also take into consideration an occupant's required safe escape time 
[RSET]. 
It can be assumed that time will elapse before the fire has been detected, each occupant 
then requires time to become aware of the alarm. A decision is then made to evacuate or 
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investigate the alarm and then the occupant travels to a place of safety. This is a 
somewhat simplistic model of the process that makes up RSET. A comparison is then 
made between RSET and ASET, in which RSET must exceed ASET to give the 
occupants a safety margin to escape as illustrated by figure 4.1. The size of the 
difference between the two times gives the safety margins, identif5'ing these safety 
margins requires consistent research as the design perimeters of building and 
investigations into human behaviour which are both in a continually evolving state. 
This information is recognised and influences RSET. 
The formula given for calculating the RSET is given as; 
Pre-movement Time + Travel Time = RSET 
The pre-movement and evacuation time can both be sub divided again into categories 
which need to be identified and assessed before an estimated evacuation time can be 
made. 
RSET 
RECOGNITION TIME / RESPONSI 
TIME 
FIGURE 4.1. EVACUATION COMPONENTS 
The pre-movement time is sub divided into recognition time and response time. Each of 
these will depend on the nature of the occupants, familiarity with the building, whether 
asleep or awake and the need for occupant assistance in evacuation. Occupants [13] who 
use the building daily and who are given staff fire training, it is suggested, will more 
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readily recognise the alarm as a fire alarm, unlike those who are unfamiliar with the 
building 
The recognition time is the period after the alarm has been sounded or a cue has been 
given, but before any response or movement by the occupants. The Australian draft code 
[28] for fire engineering was the first to include human actions with regard to occupant 
response and included a prototype occupant classification and rating. Also under 
development in Canada [46] is a prototype model in which the relationship between the 
occupant's response and different types of cues or type of warning is taken into account. 
The most important findings of recent research [23] is in the fact that the start up time 
(i.e. people's reactions to an alarm) is as important as the time it takes to physically move 
and reach an exit. The Pre-movement time and it has been suggested by Sime [13] could 
be up to two thirds of the total RSET, this is supported by investigations into the majority 
of major fire disasters. This propounds that there is a disproportionate emphasis on travel 
time and exit flow rates compared with the pre-movement time in existing codes [13]. 
Modem engineering systems now provide an increase in the ASET. The engineering 
techniques to support this advancement are: 
• smoke movement systems 
• suppression systems 
• detection systems that continually sample the atmosphere within a given space. 
Whereas to reduce the RSET the following can be utilised: 
• information warning systems (IF W) 
• good definition of escape routes 
• clear and unambiguous signage 
• a high level of lighting 
• good management control with sufficient numbers of suitably trained stafflstewards 
Early warning detection systems and IFW providing clear information all aid the move to 
a fire engineered approach to design safe time. Canter [10] suggested, lack of 
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information for the associated information gathering phase can lead to extended escape 
times. 
A technique given in the document for estimating the time available for evacuation from 
a fire is by the introduction of the Qualitative Design Review [QDR] the object of which 
is to review the building design, identify potential fire hazards and to define the problem 
in qualitative terms. Following on from this a Quantified Design Analysis [QDA] can be 
carried out by studying individual sections of the fire strategy and then comparing this 
with the model of hazard development. The guidance takes into account many factors, 
including building construction, means of escape, smoke control, fire detection, alarm 
systems, suppression systems and most importantly human factors all of which contribute 
to achieving fire safety objectives. 
The guide achieves this by defining each category into sub-systems, sub-system 6 deals 
with evacuation. It acknowledges that the information to date on human behaviour in fire 
and the method on how to calculate RSET is incomplete. In an emergency it is suggested 
that people will tend to evacuate via the route by which they entered. The design of the 
building must also be taken into account with regard to its visual accessibility of 
alternative exit routes, the openness of the design, open-plan or divided by walls, and the 
complexity of the design. The design guide advises that assumptions have been made, 
with this in mind the guidance encourages the designer to put in place safety margins by 
providing evacuation and means of escape principles based on previous guidance issued 
by the British Standards in the 5588 series. Once the evacuation time has been 
established, it should be compared with the outputs from results in the other sub-systems 
in the QDR. 
The QDR can have three types of approach 
Deterministic: 
Where the object is to show that, on the basis of the initial assumptions of the worst case 
scenario, a defined set of conditions will not occur. 
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Probabilistic: 
Where the criterion is set is that the probability of a given event occurring is acceptably 
low. The risks are usually expressed in terms of the annual probability of the unwanted 
event occurring. This concept acknowledges the repugnant nature of multiple fatalities or 
injury from fires and expressed as a societal risk. This method of understanding the way 
in which a risk can be assessed and the use of such information requires a data base of 
information of previous incidents and then a numerical element is put on various 
situations. This information must be viewed with caution. An example is the Bradford 
City Football fire. The event would have attracted a figure of zero as no other fatal fire 
had occurred in the previous eighty years at the ground. It is difficult to establish what 
level of probability is permissible or achievable in absolute terms for both the designer 
the users of the building or structure. 
Comparative: 
It is relatively straightforward to demonstrate that the design provides a level of safety 
equivalent to or greater than those in more prescriptive codes. Since such a study is 
wholly comparative, any assumptions, such as choice of smoke modelling procedures, are 
unlikely to have consequential effect on the conclusion. 
The interaction of people and fire in a building can create an infinite number of fire 
engineered solutions. In order to evaluate fire safety in large complex buildings by 
deterministic calculations, some experienced assumptions need to be made by a suitably 
qualified designer, architect or fire engineer. 
4.3 SUMMARY 
Research indicates [13] that the response of occupants will vary depending upon the 
nature of the setting e.g. shopping complex, stadium, hospital, hotel or office complex. 
Since the procedure for assessing pre-movement time is key to the production of an 
accurate fire engineered solution, research to date indicates that further definition and 
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refinement is needed so that the time required by occupants to avoid danger can be 
assessed accurately. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ASPECTS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 
5.1 PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 
In recent years, the psychological requirements of occupants have been recognised as an 
important factor which influences evacuation these factors have been taken into account 
in many evacuation models [13][25][32]. The purpose of psychological evacuation 
modelling is to identify the critical parameters and their interaction during evacuation. 
Psychologists now emphasise the human behavioural aspects of evacuation in addition to 
the structural designers who have dominated evacuation modelling for the past fifty 
years. Neither aspect can be ignored and both approaches ideally require a balance, to 
form a multi-disciplinary approach. 
5.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELS 
Psychological models describe the behavioural stages of evacuation or the discrete time 
frames that occur during an evacuation. The model developed by Proulx [32] describes 
the stages of the occupant's experience as the fire or emergency develops. These stages 
are described as occurring either: 
• Within a series of time frames, with no duration given for each frame. 
• Within discrete time frames where every specific frame is given a duration as a result 
of analysing the surrounding environmental conditions. The development of stages in 
behaviour are not discrete, because of changes in the surrounding conditions. 
Most models are founded on the principles of cognitive psychology and are designed to 
examine the principles of decision making and behavioural patterns during fire 
emergencies. In the late 1960's Wood [17] carried out a systematic study into human 
behaviour during fire evacuations and was simplistic in his approach. In this work 
emphasis was placed upon the occupants either escaping or not and an analysis of the 
occupant's actions was not considered necessary. Even though this approach was 
simplistic it started the move towards scientific investigations into human escape 
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The assumption that occupants panic and cease to act rationally, when faced with fire 
conditions has been the view for many years, this has now been presented as an 
inaccurate generalisation [24]. The assumption does not take into account the multitude 
of human responses that could be generated. The Woolworth's fire, in Manchester [29] 
was a case when even though some of the occupants were on the open plan floor of origin 
and could see the fire they failed to escape. The majority of the occupants who died were 
in the restaurant at the time. Statements from eye witnesses who escaped, stated that the 
victims were told to evacuate, but refused to as they had paid for their meal. The 
subsequent inquiry [3] found that staff training problems and a failure of staff to activate 
the alarm was responsible for the disaster that caused 10 deaths. This example give 
additional proof that panic is an individual response to fire situations, and cannot be 
linked to simplistic physical science approach to evacuation solutions. 
5.3 FIRE WARNING SYSTEMS 
A major weakness of existing simple alarm systems is that they often fail to stimulate any 
public reaction. They seemingly fail to get across the intended message. One reason for 
this in non-public buildings could be associated with the fact that occupants may hear the 
alarm many times for test or false alarms, when there is no fire or emergency. This 
supports the theory Matte [49] suggested that desensitisation of a population can occur. If 
this is applied to fire warning systems an increase the pre-movement time can be 
expected over a number of years. The problem of false alarms can be resolved through 
well installed detection systems and increased reliability in mechanical terms. The type 
of information provided by alarm systems is discussed later in this chapter and research 
has now indicated that the credibility of alarm systems is dependant on them providing 
clear information to the occupants. In a fire drill, Pauls and Jones [50] found that by 
adding a message to the alarm system; 
32 out of 51 persons who changed their initial interpretation of the situation to the 
belief that there was a fire emergency reported doing so because of the public address 
announcement'. 
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The response of the occupants will be dependant on the type of alarm system, for 
example a warning system can be consist of a simple alarm bell or siren, a pre-recorded 
message or an informative visual display. This approach is reflected in figure 5.1 and it 
is dependant upon the type of warning system installed and will need to be established in 
the qualitative design review of the building. 
Occupancy type and Recognition times in minutes and Type of warning system 
characteristics 
Wi W2 W3 
Office, industrial <1 3 >4 (occupants awake)  
Shops, assembly <2 3 >6 
building  
Hostels, boarding schools <2 4  
(sleeping but familiar 
with building)  
Hostels, boarding houses <2 4 >6  
(sleeping & unfamiliar)  
Hospitals, nursing homes <3 5 >8 
 
(sleeping & may require 
assistance)  
FIGURE 5.1 REQUIREMENTS FOR TYPES OF WARNING SYSTEMS [7] 
The guide recognises three types of alarm systems which are identified as: 
Wi : live directives, using a voice system, e.g. from a control room with 
closed-circuit television facilities. 
W2 : non-directive (pre-recorded) voice alarm systems andlor informative 
warning visual display 
W3 : warning system using alarm bell, siren or similar. 
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The occupant response, it is suggested by Sime [13], is one which can be modelled as the 
occupants cannot be considered as non-thinking objects devoid of social ties or roles, be 
they staff or public. Therefore their movements and behaviour are not random, but 
rational and consistent. These actions will be affected by the environment or building that 
they find themselves in. Sime, suggests that people do not necessarily act 
instantaneously in response to an alarm bell and that the same alarm will be interpreted in 
different ways according to the nature of the occupancy and the physical setting. This 
suggests that there is an overlap between occupant movement and occupant behaviour, 
and recognition can involve pre-movement and movement e.g. investigation. The 
preparing and gathering phase, is usually associated with the movement phase of 
evacuation, but can also involve pre-movement i.e. waiting for information, exit choosing 
or queuing. 
Paul's [51] has stated that, exit routes which carry high loads during normal use, are used 
most frequently for evacuation. The popularity of routes leading through a lobby or 
reception area gain most weight. It is suggested that this may be due to the occupants 
attempting to gain information from what is usually a centre for communications. This 
gathering phase when deciding to evacuate Sime [13] indicates that in terms of 
psychological 'rules of behaviour' occupants would prefer to leave by a familiar exit, 
rather than an exit route that they have never used before. Familiarity with escape routes 
seem to be at least as important as the travel distance as a determinant of occupants 
reaction and decision in what direction to move. This conclusion suggests there could be 
an inherent problem with escape routes, which are designed only to be used in an 
emergency. Design parameters in the majority of buildings in the last century are 
engineered on the principle of two different systems of circulation; the familiar route 
normally used and a different one, only to be used in an emergency. The cost of such 
dedicated escape routes and the possible realistic increase in safety is unlikely to be 
efficient or cost effective compared with the installation of other safety measures. 
When the author has witnessed evacuations of shopping complexes, the security staff 
have been subjected to objections and reluctance on the part of the occupants to use 
alternative or dedicated exit routes. These evacuations are carried out on premises 
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without any wayfinding exit indication problems. However these problems are evident in 
many complex buildings around the U.K. and it could be suggested that this would only 
increase the reluctance of occupants to use these exit routes. 
5.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed the various research studies that have investigated human 
factors effecting the lack of response to fire warning systems. Tong and Canter [24] have 
shown that there are three areas of failure with traditional alarm systems which are 
I 	 A failure of people to differentiate fire alarms from other types of alarm. 
2 	 A failure of people to regard fire alarms as authentic warnings of a genuine fire 
A failure of fire alarms to present infonnation which will assist fire victims in 
their attempts to deal with fire. 
The above factors coupled with a reluctance of occupants to use all the available exits are 
problems which must be overcome if satisfactory escape is to be assured. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF AN EVACUATION SYSTEM 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The various divisions of research described in Chapter two are all possibilities for 
investigation. The future of computer modelling, however, will be dependant upon the 
validation of software. This validation of an evacuation model has been indicated by 
Proulx [43] and Pauls [51] to be essential to the accurate assessment of the evacuation 
time delay. As discussed in Chapter three, it has been suggested that this will be relative 
to the population characteristics and influenced by the type of occupancy of the building. 
One method of validation would be to carry out an evacuation of a building and to 
compare the data with a computer model. It must be recognised that an evacuation drill 
does not stress those involved or cause confusion as may be found at many fire 
occurrences. Therefore any data extrapolated from such experiments must be viewed 
with caution in an objective manner with a full understanding of the limitations. They 
must be carried out to the highest standards of professional integrity and responsibility 
and at present it appears that this comparison is the only method available to researchers. 
Two unannounced evacuations of a shopping centre were carried out and a comparison 
made of evacuation times and speeds. The evacuations were unannounced to the 
members of the general public, but for security reasons and health and safety reasons the 
staff in the centre were informed prior to the drill. The overall aim in conducting the 
evacuations was to obtain data on the evacuation process this could then be compared 
with computer software for future evaluation against the software. Each behavioural 
component following the warning has a dependent probability of response accuracy as 
well as an associated time factor. 
6.2 OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTAL WORK 
The process of evacuation was evaluated by monitoring two full scale evacuations which 
were part of the normal management of the shopping complex in Preston. It is widely 
recognised that the primary object of a fire evacuation drill is to allow the staff to gain 
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further practice in directing the public to travelling along recommended fire escape 
routes. . There is a tendency to overlook many other factors, e.g. to use the occasion to 
improve the fire safety awareness of the staff; to give the staff an opportunity to 
recognise the sound of the fire alarm, and to allow management to compare the actual fire 
evacuation time with the optimum fire evacuation time. 
6.3 THE EXPERIMENT 
An evacuation was carried out at the end of 1998 and one at the start of 1999; the 
evacuations of a shopping centre were conducted with 460 and 420 occupants in the 
premises at each evacuation, respectively. The evacuations were carried out without 
prior knowledge to the public on Wednesday 9th September and Wednesday 3rd 
February, both at 16.45 hours. The late time in the day was to mitigate the financial loss 
to the stores within the shopping centre. The cost of a fire evacuation drill can vary 
appreciably even within the same company, and according to the time of day which it 
takes place. If a fire evacuation drill with pre-waming is held in the middle of a trading 
period it will involve a winding down anticipatory period, during which time trading 
levels fall. This is followed by a stoppage of all trading during the actual drill period, 
then a longer than normal 'winding up' period to the more usual trading. 
At the time of the first evacuation there were a total of 15 staff on duty; made up of 7 
security staff, 6 cleaning staff and 2 management staff. On the second evacuation there 
were 10 staff on duty made up of 5 security staff, 4 cleaning staff and one management 
staff. All of the staff are trained on fire evacuation procedures. 
The evacuations were carried out as a requirement of the Fire Certificate issued under the 
Fire Precautions Act 1971 [52]. 
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6.4 OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of the experiment was to investigate the behaviour and interactions of 
a population when engaged in the process of evacuating a shopping centre. The 
observations were also undertaken to assess the applicability of the monitoring methods 
proposed and appraise the method of measuring the data. This will include the pre-
movement times and evacuation times of occupants evacuating the premises. 
6.5 THE BUILDING 
The shopping centre was constructed in the 1960's as an open shopping complex, which 
consists of multi-decked shopping malls with an adjacent multi-storey car park. When it 
was opened in 1966, it was at the forefront of a new generation of shopping centres, with 
a catchment area of 500,000 people in the North West of England. In 1981, the malls 
were enclosed to put the whole complex under one roof. The building consists of two 
storey malls terminating in a large round atrium, providing 250,000 sq. ft. of retailing 
space in 113 retail units. The structure of the building is a concrete frame with a light 
weight steel roof. There are two principal access points to the centre at the end of each 
mall. 
Each of the retail units has at least one alternative emergency exit. The building has a 
smoke control system which has five separate smoke control zones, figure 6.1 and 6.2 
provides details of the layout of the Centre. The alarm system W2 non-directive (pre-
recorded) voice alarm systems activated system giving a warning signal followed by a 
pre-recorded message which states, 
"Attention Attention This is an evacuation please leave the centre by the nearest exit do 
not use the lis or escalators 
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Entrance 
ance 
Not To Scale 
FIGURE 6.1 SHOPPING CENTRE LEVEL ONE 
6.5 DATA RECORDING 
The evacuations were both recorded by 10 security video cameras and by an electronic 
counting system called Footfall. Footfall is a British company specialising in digital, 
video and electronic customer tracking systems. Pedestrian traffic flows have been 
developed as a key factor in helping to determine the rental value of current and future 
lettings. Tenants are also provided with feedback on the success of any marketing 
activity. The information gathered from the Footfall electronic counting system can 
identif5r the highest levels of pedestrian flow. Although this is not the primary use, this 
electronic tracking system was used to count occupants out of the Shopping Complex 
when the fire alarm was activated. The system only provides a hard copy print for every 
15 minutes, which would be of little value for a means of escape record. The continual 
readout is provided by a television monitor however, a video was made so that the results 
could be recorded in ten second segments for later analysis. This created a technical 
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problem as the tracking on the video camera causes picture flicker when videoing a 
monitor screen. This was overcome by using a camera that allowed the tracking to be 
adjusted. 
The video filming of the event was on a multi-split screen unit that has the facility for 
slow play back. The data and information was obtained by means of 10 strategically 
positioned close circuit television vision cameras. 
Entrance 
/ 
LLs 
Entrance 
Not To Scale 
FIGURE 6.2 SHOPPING CENTRE LEVEL TWO 
6.6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
At the time of the first evacuation there were 460 people in the shopping centre at the 
time of the second evacuation there were 420 people. The time required to evacuate all 
the occupants from the Shopping Centre in the first evacuation was 2 minutes 30 seconds 
and 2 minutes 40 seconds for the second evacuation. Although there was only a slight 
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difference in the two times and occupancies, on speaking to the staff on duty after both 
evacuations, they stated that the second evacuation was more difficult due to the reduced 
staffing levels. This is implied by the results with the first evacuation taking the shortest 
time with the greatest number of occupants. The evacuation times achieved were close to 
the recognised component time indicated in DD240 [7] i.e. 3 minutes for a W2 : non-
directive (pre-recorded) voice alarm systems. 
6.7 EVACUATION 1 
The following table indicates the number of persons escaping from the shopping complex 
over each 10 second interval for the first evacuation following the operation of the fire 
alarm. 
T Freq Mid F*Mp 
point  
(Mp)'2 x2(=f*TF2) 
0. 0 0 0 0 0 
10 27 5 135 25 675 
20 22 15 330 225 4950 
30 40 25 1000 625 25000 
401 54 351 1890 12251 66150 
501 29 45 1305 2025 58725 
60 36 55 1980 3025 108900 
70 31 65 2015 4225 130975 
80 37 75 2775 5625 208125 
90 30 85 2550 7225 216750 
100 34 95 3230 9025 306850 
110 37 1051 3885 110251 407925 
1201 36 115 4140 13225 476100 
130 34 125 4250 15625 531250 
140 12 135 1620 18225 218700 
150 1 145 145 21025 21025 
160 0 155 0 24025 0 
N 4601 31250 2782100 
Mean 1 	 67.93 
Standard Dev 1 	 37.85 
FIGURE 6.3 MEANAND STANDARD DE VIA HON FOR EVACUATION I 
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6.8 EVACUATION 2 
The following table indicates the number of persons escaping from the shopping complex 
over each 10 second interval for the second evacuation following the operation of the fire 
alarm. 
T Freq Mid F*Mp 
point  
(Mp)"2 x'(=rTF2) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 22 5 110 25 550 
20 19 15 285 225 4275 
30 35 25 875 625 21875 
40 55 35 1925 1225 67375 
50 20 45 900 2025 40500 
60 32 55 1760 3025 96800 
70 29 65 1885 4225 122525 
80 33 75 2475 5625 185625 
90 35 85 2975 7225 252875 
100 30 951 2850 90251 270750 
110 33 105 3465 11025 363825 
120 35 115 4025 13225 462875 
130 30 125 3750 15625 468750 
140 11 135 1485 18225 200475 
150 0 145 0 21025 0 
160 1 155 155 24025 24025 
N 420 28920 2583100 
Mean 68.85  
Standard Dev 37.53 
FIGURE 6. 4 MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION FOR EVACUATION 2 
Using the form of grouped frequency distribution, the standard deviation was calculated 
using the indirect method. Analysis of the flow rates through each exit indicated that all 
the exits were operating substantially below their capacity. This capacity is a notional 40 
persons per minute per exit width as given by the British Standard 5588 series [16]. The 
total number of units of exit width through the all the mall doors give a maximum flow 
rate of 400 persons per minute out of the premises. It can be seen that the flow rate 
through the final exit doors was well below the maximum flow rate. 
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Members of the public did not use the exits to the rear of each individual unit. It can be 
argued that these exits which were located down unfamiliar corridors and service areas 
would only be used when the malls or the exit route became untenable. It would be 
unreasonable to assume that because an exit is not used in an emergency that it will not 
be needed in the future. 
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FIGURE 6.5 GRAPH OF FLOWRATES OF OCCUPANTS FROM SHOPPING 
CENTRE 
As can be seen from the results in figure 6.3 and figure 6.5 evacuation I was carried out 
in 150 seconds and the peak flow rate or mode occurred after 40 seconds then levelled 
out at approximately 50 seconds for the next 80 seconds. Results in figure 6.4 and figure 
6.5 show that evacuation 2 took 160 seconds and a peak flow rate occurred again after 40 
seconds then levelled out for the next 80 seconds 
In figure 6.6 the data is presented by contrasting the different total frequency in the two 
evacuations by time compared with the percentage of the frequency of persons 
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evacuating. From this data it can seen that the median occurs between 60 and 70 seconds 
but more importantly the 95th percentile and the end of the evacuation occurs between 
125 and 160 seconds. This graph is very similar when compared with that produced by 
Ashe and Sheilds [53] on the Simulex model for evacuation of a retail store. 
The tail of the graph between 95% and 100% is the critical area that requires more 
investigation. At this late stage of the evacuation it is realistic to assume that it is theses 
people who may be of greatest danger in a real emergency. This is the area where 
fatalities or injuries would most likely occur. 
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FIGURE 6.6 COMPARISON OF EVACUATION I AND 2 FROM SHOPPING 
CENTRE 
6.9 COMMENT UPON OCCUPANT BEHAVIOUR 
The following observations were derived from the video recordings made during the two 
evacuations. The behaviour of the occupants could be charaeterised by self preservation, 
i.e. they did not warn others. As previously discussed, from the literature concerning 
Page 56 
fire-related human behaviour by Wood [17], Bryan [12] and Canter [10] all described the 
actions most likely attributed to people evacuating buildings this includes:- 
• seeking fUrther information 
• seeking help/calling the fire service 
• controlling the fire and smoke spread 
• searching for other occupants 
• warning/helping others 
• saving property 
• going to refuge area 
The analysis of the video recordings and observations of the evacuations suggests that the 
behaviour of the occupants did not reflect the suggested behaviours. The occupants did 
not appear to seek additional information or take action to warn other occupants. This 
could be attributed to the type of warning system and explicit nature of the pre-recorded 
message. 
It could be seen by the occupants' actions that they appear to be single-minded in their 
attitude to the evacuation. Human behaviour requires perception, thinking and 
understanding, therefore it could be implied that for a successful fire evacuation drill 
from a building must be realistic and not solely based upon physical values. These 
physical values are travel distance, type of alarm, the standard of staff training and the 
size of exits. The size of the fire and the density of the smoke cannot be programmed 
into experiments of this type. It can be assumed that these factors would affect the result 
if the evacuation was as a result of a fire. 
The shopping centre is situated in the middle of the town centre and is used as a main 
thoroughfare. This appeared to have some bearing on the objectives of each individual 
occupant. For example, during the first evacuation, two males were observed to enter the 
building when the alarm was activated and used the centre as a thoroughfare. Thus they 
continued through the centre during the evacuation. Mother example of this concerned a 
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woman pushing a child in a pram, who did not only proceed through the centre, even 
though she was close to an exit, but she continued the longest possible route at what can 
only be described as slow pace. The reason for this was that they would have 
approximately a 500 metre detour if they had to walk around the outside the centre. In 
contrast two women not using the centre as a through route were observed to enter a shop 
when the alarm was activated, they immediately turned around and left the centre by the 
nearest exit 
During the second evacuation, persons who were just entering shops moved quickly to an 
exit once the alarm had been sounded and directions given, but people observed just 
entering the centre tended to continue. In fact one woman that entered the centre one and 
a half minutes into the evacuation stopped about 30 metres into the centre and stood still 
for five seconds considering her next move. She then made a dash into the centre 
running a further 30 metres only to be stopped by a security guard and directed out to the 
nearest exit. If the incident had been a real fire one can only surmise what would have 
happened to the woman. Incorrect decision making, in times of stress appear to be 
irregular in nature and an unpredictable characteristic of human behaviour. How much of 
this erratic decision making can be predicted is the challenge that faces behaviourists. 
The reactions of most of the occupants were appropriate in the circumstances since an 
attempt to evacuate was justified due to the voice communication system and the 
established fire evacuation drill operated by security staff. This included the prompt 
opening of exits both manually and automatically, which appeared to have a significant 
effect upon the initiation of appropriate occupant action in the immediate location. The 
appropriate action was to evacuate using the nearest main mall exit. The occupants 
placed considerable trust in the information received from alarm system and the direction 
given by staff, this is evident from the fast evacuation time. This confirms that, in most 
instances, when presented with correct information the public will respond correctly and 
responsibly. This positive response may be because the occupants perceive that the 
information is being conveyed by a person in authority. 
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The pre-movement times, for the first evacuation, from the moment the alarm sounded 
until movement towards an exit commenced for the captured on video are given in figure 
6.7 and 6.8, the maximum time for this is 120 seconds. The pre-movement times, for the 
second evacuation, are given in figure 6.9 and 6.10. The maximum time for this is 130 
seconds. 
Pre-movement time for retail premises with a W2 non-directive (pre-recorded) voice 
alarm systems is 3 minutes as indicated in DD240 [7]. These results suggest that the 
experiment carried out indicated a performance considerably better that the code 
suggests. This may not be the case, however, when the occupancy density is higher for 
the centre i.e. on a Saturday afternoon before Christmas. Unfortunately, no retailer will 
allow a researcher to carry out an evacuation at such a time for financial reasons. 
On the seating area on the mall, some of the occupants in the first evacuation (two males 
and one female) did not inmiediately move when the alarm was raised. Some 60 seconds 
into the evacuation they were told to leave by staff; but ignored this instruction and had to 
be asked to leave again some 60 seconds later. After this second request, they left the 
centre. One can only surmise either they were waiting to meet someone or possibly they 
were under the influence of alcohol, but compared to the rest of the occupants their 
behaviour appeared inconsistent. Two minutes into both evacuations, staff were still 
having to tell a few occupants to leave the centre. 
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FIGURE 6.7 PRE-MO VEMENT TIME EVACUATION 1 
T Freq Mid F*MP 
point  
(Mp)"2 x'(=V"TF2) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 6 5 30 25 150 
20 13 15 195 225 2925 
30 15 25 375 625 9375 
40 6 35 210 1225 7350 
50 2 45 90 2025 4050 
60 1 55 55 3025 3025 
70 1 65 65 4225 4225 
80 0 75 0 5625 0 
90 1 85 85 7225 7225 
1001 0 951 0 90251 0 
1101 1 105 105 11025 11025 
120 0 115 0 13225 0 
130 2 125 250 15625 31250 
140 0 135 0 18225 0 
150 0 145 0 21025 0 
160 0 155 0 24025 0 
48 1460 
 80600 
Mean 1 	 30.41 __ 
Standard Dev 27.45 
FIGURE 6.8 MEANAND STANDARD DE VIATIONEVACUATION 1 
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FIGURE 6.9 PRE-.MO VEMENT TIME EVACUATION 2 
T Freq Mid F*Mp 
point  
(Mp)"2 x2(=rTF') 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 5 5 25 25 125 
20 8 15 120 225 1800 
30 11 25 275 625 6875 
40 5 35 175 1225 6125 
50 4 45 180 2025 8100 
60 0 55 0 3025 0 
70 1 65 65 4225 4225 
80 1 75 75 5625 5625 
90 0 85 0 7225 0 
1001 2 95 190 9025 18050 
110 0 105 0 11025 0 
120 3 115 345 13225 39675 
130 2 125 250 15625 31250 
140 0 135 0 18225 0 
150 0 145 0 21025 0 
160 0 1551 0 240251 0 
N 1 	 42 1700  121850 
Mean 140.47619  
Standard Dev 35.53 
FIGURE 6.10 MEANAND STANDARD DE VIA TION E VA CUA TION 2 
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A sample in the first evacuation of 48 occupants observed represented 1 0.4% of the 
population in the centre. In the second evacuation 42 occupants were observed 
representing 10%. 
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FIGURE 6.11 PRE-MOVEMENT TIME EVACUATION (SHEILDS) [ 531 
The comparison with the work of Sheilds [53] can be seen by comparing figures 6.7, 6.9 
and 6.11 all have a peak after twenty seconds yet all have a long tail or negative skew 
which equates to a Poisson distribution. This trend represents those most at risk in an 
evacuation. The nature of the activities being carried out by those persons exhibiting this 
form of behaviour presents an interesting area for further research. 
6. 10 CONCLUSIONS. 
The experiments using the Footfall digital counting mechanism proved very successful 
and the recording of all the data was carried out by the author with no assistance. The 
fire drills resulted in some interesting findings regarding occupant behaviour. The 
occupants appeared to place considerable trust in the information they received. The 
level of familiarity which the occupants possess in relation to their environment would 
certainly have had an influence on their actions when asked to respond to an emergency. 
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Information regarding the occupant's familiarity to the centre could be gathered by using 
a questionnaire to be handed out at the exits. This questionnaire could also gain 
information on the occupant's age, sex, frequency of visit, location or area of the centre 
when the alarm was raised, and the individuals perceived actions when the alarm was 
raised. This type of information was too labour intensive for this project, however when 
this type of experiment has been carried out in other cases i.e. NFPA or Shields [14],[54] 
the response rate to the questionnaires has been between 30% and 50%. This requires a 
high labour requirement which would not be realistic for this study. Higher return rates 
have been achieved by questionnaires that have been carried out following a real fire 
event in residential accommodation by Sekizawa [55] and Proulx [56]. Proulx carried 
out a questionnaire in 1997 in Canada and achieved a return rate of 80%, when Sekizawa 
carried out a similar exercise in 1996 and achieved a return rate of 48%. 
The reaction of most of the occupants appear to be appropriate in the circumstances, 
since the information that they received justified there was an emergency in the centre. 
This confirms that in most instances the public are prepared to follow instructions 
especially when this information is provided by a person in authority. 
One area for concern regarding the recent decision of many operators of shopping centres 
to move away from the usual military style uniform to a informal blazer in an effort to 
make the security staff more customer friendly. British Standard 5588 part 10 [16] 
recommends that security staff are identifiable by dress this leaves the question of the 
uniform open to interpretation. 
It is of note that as a member of the fire service, my personal experience whilst visiting 
shopping centres in fire service uniform, is that the members of the public approach me 
for information and ignore the security staff in their customer friendly uniform. 
The similarity in the observed behaviour in the response to both fire evacuation drills in a 
similar environment may be explained in part by the task characteristics of the perceived 
emergency and the mode of cognitive processing created by such circumstances. This 
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suggests that untrained, unprepared occupants tend to resort to informal or intuitive 
processing, which can be influenced by instruction from either direction from an alarm 
system or by persons in authority. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
The main factor that prompts research into fire evacuation must be related to the 
statistics gathered regarding fire incidents from all over the world. The various 
approaches adopted by researchers have been varied and to a certain extent fragmented. 
This has prompted the holding of the first International symposium into Human 
Behaviour in Fire held in Belfast in August 1998. This symposium brought together the 
various components of the research to date, and has presented researchers with an outlook 
on the future of human behaviour in fire research which is more promising today than at 
anytime in the past. With this pro-active outlook, a realisation is emerging on the 
importance to determine valid evacuation times in the design of buildings under the 
performance codes similar to DD 240 [27]. 
7.1 FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
Researchers such as Proulx have reported on the method for alerting the occupants of a 
building will directly impact on the time delay before an evacuation is initiated. At 
present current models comprise of analytical components that attempt to compare data 
from various research studies. As the quantity and quality data from researchers is 
increased, the input data for these models can be refined, so that an increase in their 
accuracy can be achieved. In the short term, whilst this research is progressing, the 
greatest influence on the safety of the public in complex buildings will relate to the 
accuracy of the fire alarm message and the quality of the management control over the 
fire. 
7.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In chapter two, research methodologies and fire studies of various kinds were discussed 
which show that the nature of an individual's behaviour during an emergency evacuation 
will be dependant upon many factors, such as prior knowledge, experience and training. 
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A more scientific approach by fire engineers is now in use and the details of this 
approach was given in chapter three. With a more scientific approach to evacuation 
problems it is hoped that future deaths and injuries in complex buildings will be 
significantly reduced. 
Research has indicated [13] that the response of occupants will vary depending upon the 
nature of the setting e.g. shopping complex, stadium, hospital, hotel or office complex 
and this was discussed in chapter four. Since the procedure for assessing pre-movement 
time is key to the production of an accurate fire engineered solution. Research to date 
indicates that further definition and refinement is needed so that the time required by 
occupants to avoid danger can be assessed accurately. 
7.3 HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 
Chapter five outlined the various research studies that have investigated human factors 
effecting the lack of response to fire warning systems. Tong and Canter [24] have shown 
that there are areas of failure with traditional alarm systems, but technological advances 
in informative warning systems overcome the lack of response. 
7.4 EXPERIMENTAL OBSERVATIONS 
Two evacuation experiments were carried out and it can be seen that the reaction of most 
of the occupants appeared to be expected, since the information that they received 
justified there was an emergency in the centre. This confirms research by Proulx and 
Sime [19] that in most instances the public are prepared to follow instructions, especially 
when this information is provided by a person in authority. 
Although the experimental observations are limited to only two evacuations, the results 
are similar to those carried out by Shields [54]. Specifically the pre-movement times that 
were observed were similar to data from experiments carried out by Shields [54]. The 
pre-movement time peaked after twenty seconds and the similarity of the critical tail or 
the final occupants to evacuate, can be seen by comparing the data.. This can be said to 
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relate to human behaviour and the concepts of avoidance, commitment, affiliation and 
role as described by Proulx [32]. 
7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.6.1 STAFF TRAINING 
A plan should set out a fire safety management structure that identifies the person or 
persons responsible for all matters relating to fire safety. A fire safety manager should 
have overall control of the premises relating to matters of fire safety and should be given 
the necessary support. He/she should have an appreciation of fire precautions within the 
building and their purpose. He/she should take charge of the evacuation and should liase 
with the fire service on their arrival. A deputy to the fire safety manager should be 
appointed, who will take control in the absence of the manager. The experiment detailed 
in Chapter 6 with the fast evacuation time and well trained staff serves to endorse this 
opinion. 
Staff require effective training in what actions to take in a fire to reduce delay in 
evacuation. Their role is crucial. They should know the building and what might or 
might not be expected to occur. Staff should be identifiable as members of the public 
will seek them out (for instruction and information). They are likely to have the earliest 
warning of any fire and are thus in the best position to act effectively in aiding 
evacuation. This could be said to be the software of the evacuation solution, it is labour 
intensive with a high financial cost and a requirement by management to be proactive and 
enthusiastic. 
Roles, status and position in a hierarchy can be seen as clear influences on patterns of 
behaviour. Coping with fire becomes a matter of recognising the potential of the role 
structure, which already exists and its inherent weaknesses. People who are in important 
and critical positions in the communication system do not always appreciate the 
significance of their role in a crisis and can have a considerably negative effect in the 
event of a fire e.g. the announcer in the control room at Summerland 1973 [34]. People 
should be aware of their role vis-à-vis the public and other members of their hierarchy. 
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As certain people hold such pivotal positions, they should be made aware of the 
appropriate actions and necessity for precise and clear communication. This is especially 
the case, when a rapidly developing fire means that the critical time to escape is very 
short as can be seen from the study conducted with regard to the Manchester Woolworths 
fire [6]. 
Staff training must take place so that individuals clearly understand their particular role 
and responsibilities in the event of afire. This training should include: 
1. Action to be taken on discovery of a fire; 
2. Operation details of mechanical and electrical systems; 
3. Routine testing and maintenance information; 
4. Logs for records of tests, evacuations; etc. 
5. Details of drawings of the various types of active and passive fire protection 
measures; 
6. The fire action plan. 
The plan must be tailored to include: 
1. Arrangements for calling the fire service and providing the necessary information 
upon their arrival; 
2. Procedures about evacuation, including adequate assistance for people with 
disabilities; 
3. Arrangements for shutting down plant where necessary; 
4. Arrangements for first aid fire fighting if appropriate. 
The type of alarm system installed in a particular building should be of a type adequate to 
enable the occupants to understand that it is a fire alarm. 
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7.6.2 CORRECT ALARM SYSTEM 
Proulx and Sime's experiment in a station of the Tyne and Wear Metro [52] indicated 
that success in evacuation was improved, when bells were combined with clear directive 
information. This coupled with a well rehearsed fire plan and trained staff will enhance 
the evacuation process. 
It crucial that it is recognised that occupants do not necessarily immediately move to an 
exit once the alarm has sounded. Therefore it must be recognised that an alarm system 
that imparts the greatest amount of information to occupants will improve the evacuation 
process. In buildings such as well-managed theatres, supermarkets and offices, where 
regular drills are carried out, the pre-movement time may be relatively short. However, 
in multi-compartment buildings and buildings, where families or groups may be 
separated i.e. the fire Summerland fire of 1973 the pre-movement time may vary in 
different locations. Therefore the alarm systems required in such buildings should be 
upgraded, where required, to give the necessary information to occupants. 
7.7 PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER WORK 
The prospects for further work are the carrying-out of more evacuation experiments in 
order to develop reliability in the determination of pre-movement times. Further 
experiments would be in other types of premises of varying configurations and 
occupancies, using the same type of recording equipment that proved effective in the two 
experiments carried out. 
7.4 SUMMARY 
A better understanding of the interaction between occupant behaviour and various fire 
alarm systems in complex buildings is closer to being fully understood. Assumptions 
about fire, building design and human behaviour must be balanced and yet requires to be 
dynamic as in modem society any of the factors could be mutable. Therefore, a shift in 
engineering and psychological imperatives may be necessary so that a correct 
relationship or balance exists between building design and fire engineered solutions. 
Page 69 
REFERENCES 
Post-war Building Studies, Joint Committee 29 The Building Research and Fire 
Officers Committee. 1946 
2 	 Gardner, J. Building Design and Human Behaviour in Fires The Fire Engineers 
Journal, July 1996. 
3 	 Bickerdike Allen Partners, Design principles of fire safety, HIVISO. 
4 	 Fire Service College notes. 1996. 
5 	 Home Office ,Statistics Division, United Kingdom. 1996. 
6 	 HMI Kent D. Power Point Presentation on the Workplace Regulations 27/7/97 
7 	 British Standard Institute. Drafi for Development Fire Engineering in Building 
Part 1. 1997 Guide to the application of fire safety engineering principles. 
8 	 The Building Regulations 1991 Approved Document B. 1992 Edition. 
9 	 Bartlett; An earth shattering experience, Fire Prevention 293 Oct 1996. 
10 	 Canter, D. "Fires and Human Behaviour: An Introduction", (ed) David Canter, 
Fire and Human Behaviour, 1st Edit. London, 1980, pp  001-012. 
11 	 Sime, J. Escape Behaviour in Fires and Evacuations- Design Against Fire, an 
Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering Design - Edited by Stollard and Johnston 
1994. 
12 	 Bryan, J. Human Behaviour in Fire , Fire Protection Handbook, A. E. Cote Ed, 
17th Edition National Fire Protection Association 1991. 
13 	 Sime, J. Assessing the Occupant Response Safety Factor in Evacuation Time 
Calculations Interflam 1996. 
14 	 An Examination and Analysis of the Dynamics of the Human Behaviour in the 
MGM Grand Hotel Fire, Clark County, Nevada, November 1980. NFPA. 
15 	 Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds; HMSO. 
16 	 British Standard 5588 Partl to part 11. 
17 	 Wood, P. G. The Behaviour of People in Fire: Fire res note No 953 Fire Research 
Station.! 972 
Page 70 
18 	 Canter, D. The Behaviour of People in Fire Situations: Possibilities for Research. 
CP11/76BRE, 1976. 
19 	 Proulx,G. and Sime, J. "To prevent panic", Fire safety Science Proceedings of the 
Third International Symposium New York 1991. 
20 	 Fire Prevention, issue 260; Fire Protection Association, London : FPA, June 1993 
21 	 Peschl, I. Flow capacity of door openings in panic situations, Bouw. 1971 
22 	 Experimental programme to investigate infonnative warning characteristics for 
motivating fast evacuation, Fire Research Station, 1990. 
23 	 Sime, J. Perceived Time Available: The Margin of Safety in Fires. Fire Safety 
Science Proceedings of the first International Symposium, 1986. 
24 	 Tong,D and Canter,D. The Decision to Evacuate: a Study of the motivations 
which Contribute to Evacuation in the Event of Fire. 1994. 
25 	 Galea, E. R. Emergency Egress from large Buildings under fire simulations using 
Exodus; Interfiam '96. 
26 	 Fire Engineering Journal July 1996. 
27 	 Draft Fire Safety Engineering in Buildings issued by British Standard Institution 
DD240 third draft October 1996. 
28 	 Predicted Human Behaviour and Evacuation under different alarm conditions by 
Cesare-risk, Fire Code Reform Centre, Fire Engineering Guidelines. The Third 
International Seminar on Fire and Explosion Hazards University of Central 
Lancashire April 2000. 
29 	 Fire Prevention, June 1996. 
30 	 Fire safety in retail premises Fire Protection Association, London : FPA, 1994. 
31 	 British Standards 476 ;Fire Tests on Building Materials. 
32 	 Proulx,G. Occupant Response Model: Fire Safety Science: 1993. 
33 	 Personal interview with Mr Walker Manager of the Arndale Shopping Complex 
Manchester. 
34 	 Manual of firemanship a survey of the science of fire-fighting. Book 9: Fire 
protection of buildings. Home Office Second edition 1990 
35 	 Melinek, S. J. An analysis of evacuation times in buildings. 1976. 
Page 71 
36 	 Dato Soh Chai Hock, Fire Safety Design of the Worlds Tallest Twin Towers: Fire 
Engineers Journal: November 1997. 
37 	 Yoshiyuki Yoshida; A Study of the Evacuation Behaviour in the World Trade 
Centre Explosion. 
38 	 Donald, I; and Canter, D; Behavioural Aspects of the King's Cross Disaster Fires 
and Human Behaviour. 
39 	 Pauls, J. Calculating evacuating time for tall buildings. Fire Safety Journal, 12, 
1987, 213-236 
40 	 British Standard 5588 part 6 Code of practice for Assembly Buildings, 1991. 
41 	 Report of the Summerland Fire Commission, Government Office, Isle of Man. 
42 	 Hansell, G. Smoke Control in the 21st Century: Fire Engineering Journal May 
1996. 
43 	 J. Pauls; Vertical evacuation in large building: Missed opportunities for research. 
Disaster Management Volume 6 number 3 1994. 
44 	 Kendik, F. Designing escape routes in buildings. Fire Technology,22. 1986 
45 	 Melinek, S. J. and Booth, S. An analysis of evacuation times and the movement 
of crowds in buildings. BRE CP 88/75. 
46 	 NFPA Manual on Alternative Approaches in Life Safety. NFPA 10IM 
47 	 Ramachandran, G. Probabilistic Evaluation of Design Evacuation Time, 1993. 
48 	 Bryan, J. Smoke as a Determinant of Human Behaviour in Fire Situations, 
University of Maryland, 1977. 
49 	 Matte, I. Observations of the English in Wartime. 1943. 
50 	 Pauls, J. A Personal Perspective on Research, Consulting and Codes/Standards 
Development in Fire-Related Human Behaviour, 1969-1999, with Emphasis on 
Space and Time Factors. Fire and Materials International Journal Vo123 No6 Nov 
IDec 1999 
51 	 Pauls, J. L, Building Evacuation; Research Findings and Recommendations. 
52 	 The Fire Precautions Act 1971, The Home Office for England and Wales issued 
HMSO. 
Page 72 
53 	 Ashe,B and Sheilds J. Analysis and modelling of the unannounced evacuation of a 
large retail store. Human Behaviour in Fire —Proceedings of the First International 
Symposium 1998. 
54 	 Shields,T J. Unannounced Evacuation of Large Urban Retail Store. The Third 
International Seminar on Fire and Explosions University of Central Lancashire 
April 2000 
55 	 Sekizawa,A. Occupants' Behaviour in response to the High-rise Apartments Fire 
in Hiroshima City 1996. 
56 	 Proulx,G. The impact of voice communication messages during a residential high 
rise fire. 1997 Human Behaviour in Fire - Proceedings of the First International 
Symposium 1998. 
57 	 Harper WM Statistics. 6th Edition. M&E Business Handbooks. 1994 pp 137 - 
138). 
Page 73 
